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This Article presents an empirical study of Alaska Civil Rule 82,
Alaska's attorney's fee shifting rule. It briefly describes the history
of fee shifting before outlining how fee shifting became a common
practice in Alaska, as well as the purposes of its adoption. The
Article then traces the legal and procedural requirements of Rule
82, offering interview comments of Alaska attorneys and judges
to illustrate how the rule works in practice. Next, the Article
compares Alaska and national case filing statistics that demon-
strate the rule's effects on the filing of various civil lawsuits. The
Article concludes that Rule 82 influences Alaska's legal system in
a variety of subtle, unexpected ways that proponents of such
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schemes often do not envision. Finally, the Article offers recom-
mendations to Alaskan and national policymakers on attorney's
fee shifting regimes based on Alaska's experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proposals in the last decade to reform the civil justice system
in the United States have attempted to make it fairer and more
efficient. One proposal that has surfaced repeatedly, most recently
on an ABC television special' and in the Republican House
majority's 1994 "Contract with America," would require the loser
in a civil lawsuit to pay all or a portion of the winner's attorney's
fees. Fee shifting proponents usually argue that a party who might
have to pay for the other side's attorney's fees would be less likely
to abuse the system by bringing frivolous or marginal litigation.2
Fee shifting proposals have led to extensive discussion and press
coverage, but that discussion has never included any significant
recognition that Alaska already requires the loser in a lawsuit to
pay a portion of the winner's attorney's fees in almost every
category of civil cases. Indeed, fee shifting in Alaska has been the
law since the nineteenth century.
Alaska Civil Rule 82 entitles the prevailing party in a civil
lawsuit to partial compensation of his or her attorney's fees from
the losing party.3 The rule applies to the great majority of civil
cases4 and directs judges to calculate the amount of attorney's fees
1. The Trouble With Lawyers (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1996).
2. Commentators have identified several other rationales for attorney fee
shifting. One argument is that the winner in a lawsuit is not "made whole" or
fully compensated unless the other side also pays the winner's attorney's fees. See
generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Searching for Winners in a Loser Pays System, 78
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 55; Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37; Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 4
DuKE L.J. 651 (1982). A second argument is that fee shifting makes it economi-
cally feasible for private citizens to bring lawsuits that benefit the public interest
but do not directly benefit their own financial interests. See generally Pfennigstorf,
supra; Rowe, supra. A third argument is that fee shifting gives people of limited
means better access to the courts by letting their attorneys collect their fees from
the opposing party. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966).
3. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 (1995).
4. Domestic cases are the largest excluded category, along with cases in which
a contract governs attorney's fees. See, e.g., Gudeneau v. Bierra, 868 P.2d 907,
912-13 (Alaska 1994) (contract governing attorney's fees); Hilliker v. Hilliker, 828
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awarded using several variables. A party recovering a money
judgment receives a percentage of the judgment. For a case
contested with a trial, the percentage is 20% for the first $25,000
and 10% for any additional amount. Percentages for non-contested
cases and those contested without trial are less. Attorney's fees for
a party who prevails but does not recover a money judgment are
calculated as a percentage of actual reasonable fees. The percent-
age is 30% for cases that go to trial and 20% for cases that do not.
In either situation, the court can vary the award based on factors
listed in the rule.
Those who favor fee shifting argue that it would restrain
frivolous or marginal litigation and more fully compensate the
prevailing party.' Opponents warn that it would deter meritorious
as well as frivolous claims and defenses, fail to distinguish between
the real winners and losers in a lawsuit and produce windfalls as
well as draconian penalties.6 While a number of scholars have
written about the probable effects of adopting two-way fee shifting
in American jurisdictions, few have studied the question empirical-
ly.
This Article empirically documents the effects of Rule 82's
two-way fee shifting on civil litigation in Alaska. It addresses
practical questions raised by opponents and advocates of fee
shifting, such as how does the rule operate? How often are
attorney's fees awarded in Alaska, to whom and in what amounts?
The Article also addresses several broader questions, such as
whether two-way fee shifting as it exists in Alaska encourages
settlement of civil litigation. Does it help avoid protracted
litigation? Does it deter the filing of "frivolous" or marginal
lawsuits? Does the rule create inequities depending on the relative
wealth of the parties? Does it have a "chilling effect" on access to
the courts? Since fee shifting is of interest locally and nationally,
the Article tries to present the answers in a form that is useful both
to practitioners in Alaska and to policymakers in other jurisdictions
who might be considering adopting fee shifting for the first time
P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1992) (domestic case).
5. See, e.g., John Stossel, Protect Us From Legal Vultures, WALL ST. J., Jan.
2, 1996, at A8.
6. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 2; Andrew J. Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys'
Fees in Alaska: A Rebuttal, 24 JUDGES' 3., Summer 1985, at 39.
7. Because these issues are extremely complex, the Article approaches them
from a number of different angles. One perspective comes from federal and state
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Part II of this Article sets the context for the data and findings
by discussing fee shifting both inside and outside of Alaska. It
briefly traces the history of the rule in England and in the United
States. It then describes how Alaska's fee shifting rules have
evolved and speculates why Alaska developed so differently from
the rest of the country. Part III focuses on the legal issues
surrounding the application of Alaska's Rule 82 by examining data
from Alaska state and federal court case files and interviews with
Alaska attorneys about how these legal issues work in practice.
Part IV presents the bulk of the data and findings of the study,
both by comparing Alaska and other states' case filing statistics and
by examining recently closed state and federal cases in Anchorage
that show how Rule 82 operates in practice. Part V offers
conclusions and recommendations to Alaska and national policy-
makers regarding the desirability of a two-way fee shifting system.
II. FEE SHIFTING-HISTORY AND PURPOSE
A. Historical Background
In most European countries, civil litigation follows the general
rule that the losing party pays the winning party's attorney's fees,
a practice that is loosely referred to as the "European Rule."' The
objective fact of defeat justifies a fee award against the loser
without requiring evidence of fault or bad faith. In England and
Continental Europe, the rationale for this practice is that victory is
not complete if it leaves substantial expenses unpaid.'
During colonial times, the law of attorney fee recovery in
court case files. Another view comes from interviews with trial and appellate
judges. A third outlook arises from interviews with practicing civil attorneys.
While each perspective is skewed in some way, taken together they provide a
balanced view of how attorney fee shifting works and how it affects civil litigation
practice. Although the data from these different sources are not strictly
comparable, we have tried to contrast them wherever possible to give the most
complete picture. The Article does not attempt to identify a control group of
cases in which Rule 82 did not apply because it applies to most state civil cases
and to federal diversity cases. For a full description of the methodology used, the
interview questions and answers and the case sample composition, see AJC,
ALASKA'S ENGLISH RULE, supra note *, at app. A-D.
8. Pfennigstorf, supra note 2, at 37, 44.
9. Id. at 83.
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America followed the European Rule." An important difference
was that colonial statutes that regulated the fees recoverable from
a defeated adversary also regulated the maximum fees that lawyers
could charge their clients." After the American Revolution,
attorneys who opposed government regulation of their fees won
repeal of these statutes, although legislation still permitted small
fixed awards to the prevailing party. By the late nineteenth
century, courts began to interpret the statutes as excluding
attorney's fees from the category of recoverable costs and to deny
recovery of attorney's fees as damages. 2 The term "American
Rule" came into use in the early twentieth century to describe the
practice of requiring each side to pay its own attorney's fees. 3
In practice, numerous statutes provide for either one-way or
two-way fee shifting in the United States today.'4 Legislatures use
fee shifting to encourage such public policies as civil rights,
consumer protection and enforcement of environmental statutes.
They also see fee shifting as an appropriate punitive measure and
authorize its use to discourage frivolous or bad faith litigation.
Federal law includes over two hundred statutes that shift fees for
reasons similar to those underlying state statutes. 5 Despite these
exceptions, the American Rule still applies to most civil litigation.
10. Arthur L. Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 10.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 23 (citing Hoffman v. Smith, 61 Miss. 544 (1884); Swartzwell v.
Rogers, 3 Kan. 375 (1866)).
13. The term is attributed to John Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L. 849 (1929).
Leubsdorf, supra note 10, at 28 n.130.
14. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321, 323. The
authors surveyed 4,000 to 5,000 existing statutes that empowered "courts to require
one party to pay the other party's attorney fees." Id (emphasis in original). They
found 1,974 fee shifting statutes in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
Id.
One-way fee shifting awards attorney's fees to a specified party (usually the
plaintiff) if that party prevails but requires each side to pay its own fees if that
party does not prevail. Two-way fee shifting requires the non-prevailing party,
whether plaintiff or defendant, to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees.
Alaska's Rule 82 and the English Rule are two-way fee shifting in principle but
sometimes become one-way fee shifting in practice. See infra Part III.E.
15. See 3 MARY FRANCIS DERFNBR & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES, tbl. of statutes (1983) (listing federal and state statutes that
provide for attorney's fee awards).
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During the 1980s and 1990s, several groups proposed two-way
fee shifting as a tort or civil justice reform measure. The best-
known of these groups, the Council on Competitiveness chaired by
Vice-President Dan Quayle, proposed fee shifting in 1991.
Although the proposal generated substantial controversy, President
Bush issued an Executive Order providing for limited fee shifting
in some federal cases.' 6 In 1994, Republicans proposed a "Con-
tract with America," providing for fee shifting in some types of
cases as a "Common Sense Legal Reform." However, Congress
has not yet passed legislation to implement fee shifting.
B. History of Fee Shifting in Alaska 7
Fee shifting in Alaska can be traced back to the Field Codes
of the mid-1800s, coming to Alaska through the application of
Oregon law during territorial days. There is no clear answer why
Alaska retained a more English approach to fee shifting than did
the rest of the United States. It appears that Alaska followed its
separate course more through historical accident than through a
conscious decision to reject the American Rule.
1. Pre-Statehood. On March 30,1867, Russia signed a treaty
selling its claims to the territory known as Alaska to the United
States. Congress made no provision for any sort of civil govern-
ment in Alaska for the next seventeen years. 8 In 1884, Congress
designated Alaska as a civil and judicial district. 9 Congress also
provided that "the general laws of the State of Oregon now in
16. Executive Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 519 (1994). The order, which applies to civil suits initiated by the United States,
provides: "[L]itigation counsel shall offer to enter into a two-way fee shifting
agreement with opposing parties to the dispute, whereby the losing party would
pay the prevailing party's fees and costs, subject to reasonable terms and
limitations." Id at 362.
17. Some of the information contained in this sub-Part comes from research
performed by Ceceile Kay Richter in 1992 for the Alaska Court System's Court
Rules Attorney.
18. Frederic E. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes Part II:
The Codes and Alaska, 1867-1901, 2 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 87, 88 (1973).
19. Id. at 90. The legislation was known as the Alaska Government Act of
1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24. The Act also created other governmental positions,
including a governor to be appointed by the President and a district judge to hold
court at Sitka. Id
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force are hereby declared to be the law in said district."' Thus,
Oregon's statutes, including its provisions regarding attorney's fees,
became the law in Alaska. An 1862 Oregon statute permitted
attorneys and their clients to negotiate their own fee arrangements
and also allowed a prevailing party to recover certain costs of the
action, including attorney's fees, from the defeated party.21 Other
Oregon laws provided that a prevailing plaintiff should receive
costs as a matter of course in certain civil actions and that a party
entitled to costs should also be allowed to recover all necessary
disbursements in proving its case, including witness fees, court fees,
deposition expenses and costs relating to the preparation of
documents used as evidence at trial.' Furthermore, the Oregon
statutes provided procedures for applying for costs and disburse-
ments from the clerk, subject to a right to an appeal to be heard by
the judge.'
20. Id. According to Brown, Congress's choice of Oregon law was "fairly
arbitrary." Brown, supra note 18, at 91. Apparently, the congressional drafters
had considered either Washington or Oregon laws for Alaska but chose Oregon's
as the more developed of the two. Id.
21. See THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND OTHER GENERAL STATUTES
OF OREGON ch. 6, tit. V, § 538 (1863) (Code Commissioners: M. P. Deady, A. C.
Gibbs, J. K. Kelly); GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON 1843-1872 ch. 6, tit. V, § 538
(1874) (compiled and annotated by M. P. Deady and L. Lane). Specifically,
section 538 provided:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
agreement expressed or implied of the parties; but there may be allowed
to the prevailing party in the judgment or decree, certain sums by way of
indemnity for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or suit or
defence thereto, which allowances are termed costs.
Id. Another section of Oregot's 1863 law specified the amount of costs allowed
to either party: to the prevailing party in the supreme court, $15; to the prevailing
party in the circuit court without trial, $5, and with trial, $10; and to the prevailing
party in the county court, half the amount allowed in the circuit court. Id. § 542.
22. See GENERAL LAWs OF OREGON 1843-1872 ch. 6, tit. V, §§ 539, 543. In
the late 1800s, judges began to disallow attorney's fees as one of the permissible
costs. Leubsdorf, supra note 10, at 23.
23. See id. §§ 539, 543, 546, 547, 548. Since territorial days, Oregon has kept
laws on its books giving a small fee to the prevailing party as part of costs and
disbursements. Court Rule 68 governed payment of the fees. However, in 1995,
the Oregon Legislature revised its statutes, increasing the statutory prevailing party
fees and permitting two-way attorney fee shifting in some cases. The legislature
used Alaska's Rule 82 as its source for some parts of the law. Telephone
interviews with Max Williams and David Heynderickx, counsel to the Oregon
Senate Judiciary Committee and Legislative Counsel (August 14, 1995), and
Professor Maury Holland, University of Oregon School of Law (August 23, 1995).
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Oregon statutes continued to govern court-awarded attorney's
fees in Alaska's territorial courts until 1900, when Congress passed
a code of civil procedure for the District of Alaska.24 Fee shifting
continued under the new code, which included a provision similar
to Oregon's prevailing party fee shifting authorization.' In 1949,
Congress amended the Alaska Government Act to apply the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the United States District
Court for the Territory of Alaska. 6 Although the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure did not contain provisions for attorney fee
shifting, the territorial fee shifting statute had not been repealed.
To the best of our knowledge, because Congress had not repealed
the earlier territorial statute, and because nothing in the federal
rules prohibited court-awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing
party, fee shifting continued to be the practice in Alaska.
A review of the court's rules for the Territory gives another
picture of prevailing parties' entitlement to fees. The court rules
in effect in 1922 made no mention of fee shifting or prevailing
parties. By March 7, 1947, however, the rules provided that "the
prevailing party in the judgment shall be allowed the sum of twenty
dollars, by way of indemnity for his attorney's fees in maintaining
The new legislation set a schedule of prevailing party fees not tied directly to
attorney fees. Parties can automatically recover $250 without trial or $500 with
a trial in the circuit court, and lesser amounts in the lower courts. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 20.190(2) (1995). The circuit court may award up to $5,000 more after
considering various factors, including "any award of attorney fees made to the
prevailing party as part of the judgment." Id. § 20.190(3). Legislators modified
about 115 existing statutes that mandatorily shifted fees for prevailing plaintiffs by
permitting discretionary fee shifting to the prevailing party. Oregon S. 385, 68th
Leg. Assembly, ch. 618 (1995). They also provided for shifting attorney's fees
after arbitration if the appealing party does not better its position in the
subsequent court proceedings. Id-
24. See Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, 31 Stat. 321 ("[A]n act making further
provision for a civil government for Alaska, and for other purposes.").
25. The Act provided:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
agreement, expressed or implied, of the parties; but there may be allowed
to the prevailing party in the judgment certain sums by way of indemnity
for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or defense thereto, which
allowances are termed costs.
Id. § 509. The Act differed from the Oregon statutes in that it did not set fees in
specific amounts for specific courts.
26. Act of July 18, 1949, ch. 343, 63 Stat. 445.
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the action, or defense thereto."'27 By April 30, 1953, the local
federal rules had been amended to give a schedule for lien, non-
lien and divorce cases to "be adhered to in fixing such fees for the
prevailing party as a part of the costs of action allowed by law."
The rules in effect on January 28, 1956, kept the same schedules
but added that "[i]n all other cases where the above schedule shall
not be applicable, the court shall fix such fee in favor of the
prevailing party as shall appear just and reasonable."29
2. Statehood and After. President Eisenhower proclaimed
Alaska a state on January 3, 1959.30 Territorial laws continued in
effect until the new legislature could pass its own statutes. The
new state's constitution gave the Alaska Supreme Court the power
to promulgate administrative rules and rules of civil and criminal
procedure for the state courts.3' The three justices appointed to
the Alaska Supreme Court adopted rules of civil and criminal
procedure for the state court system32 that took effect on February
24, 1960, when the court system began to function.33
The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 82,
awarding partial attorney's fees to the prevailing party as costs,
unless the court in its discretion otherwise directed. Unlike most
of the other civil rules adopted, Rule 82 had no federal counter-
part. To guide the trial court in making fee awards, the rule set
forth schedules of attorney's fees to be followed in civil cases for
any "party recovering any money judgment therein., 34  These
schedules set different amounts for liens and other claims and
27. LOCAL FED. R. Civ. P. 46 (1947). All former federal local rules are cited
from a collection of Judge H. Russel Holland, United States District Court,
District of Alaska.
28. LOCAL FED. R. Crv. P. 45 (1953).
29. LOCAL FED. R. Civ. P. 25 (1956).
30. Proclamation No. 3269, Jan. 3, 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (1959), reprinted in
73 Stat. c16 (1959).
31. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
32. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order Nos. 4-5 (1959). Most of the state court rules
of civil procedure are derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown,
supra note 18, at 109. Those that do not are taken from the codes of procedure
in the earlier Oregon law. Id.
33. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 17 (1960).
34. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(1) (1959). The rule also permitted the court, in
its discretion, to fix fees in a reasonable amount for cases in which no monetary
recovery was awarded. The rule closely resembled the 1956 version of the
territorial court's rule.
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varied the awards for "contested" cases, cases "without trial" or
"noncontested" cases."
The second session of the 1962 legislature approved a bulk
formal revision of the state laws, including a complete revision of
the Code of Civil Procedure.36 By repealing the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the legislature also repealed all the existing statutory
provisions pertaining to the allowance of attorney's fees and costs.
The new Code of Civil Procedure codified the prevailing party's
right to attorney's fees:
Costs Allowed Prevailing Party. Except as otherwise provided
by statute, the supreme court [of Alaska] shall determine by rule
or order what costs, if any, including attorney fees, shall be
allowed the prevailing party in any case.37
The statutes underlying Rule 82 have remained relatively un-
changed since statehood."
More action on fee shifting occurred in the supreme court.
New court rules in 1963 deleted the distinction between lien and
non-lien cases.39 The court also added a subsection that permitted
judges to vary from the schedule when the money judgment was
not an accurate criterion for deciding the fee to be allowed to the
prevailing side.' The fee for those cases was to be commensurate
35. Id.
36. See 1962 Alaska Sess. Laws 101. This law promulgated a revised Alaska
Code of Civil Procedure and repealed the old one, both effective January 1, 1963.
37. Id. § 5.14 (codified as ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1962)).
38. In 1986, a tort reform provision amended the basic statute to eliminate fee
shifting in non-contested civil tort actions. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 139, § 4
(amending ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1962)). The statute currently provides in
relevant part:
The supreme court shall determine by rule or order the costs, if any, that
may be allowed a prevailing party in a civil action. Unless specifically
authorized by statute or by agreement between the parties, attorney fees
may not be awarded to a party in a civil action for personal injury, death,
or property damage related to or arising out of fault.., unless the civil
action is contested without trial, or fully contested as determined by the
court.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1994). Section 8 of the same act amended Rule 82
"by prohibiting the award of attorney fees in certain civil actions based on fault,
unless allowed by statute or by agreement of the parties or unless the civil action
is contested without trial or fully contested." 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 139, § 8.
39. See Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 49 (1962). These changes became effective
on January 1, 1963, and were published in ALASKA RuLES OF COURT PROCE-
DURE AND ADMINISTRATION 1962.
40. See ALASKA. R. Civ. P. 82(a)(2) (1962).
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with the amount and value of legal services rendered.4'
From statehood until the early 1970s, the supreme court
decided various challenges to Rule 82. The court also considered
a series of recommendations from local bar associations. A 1962
letter from the Juneau Bar Association called for "a substantial
increase in the amount allowed to the successful party."'42 Other
local bar associations proposed changes in 1963, 1967 and 1970, all
oriented toward increasing the awards for non-monetary judgments
and creating more uniformity in awards. In 1972, the supreme
court's Civil Rules Committee directed a subcommittee to evaluate
Rule 82. Concerns about the uncertainties created by what the Bar
apparently saw as too much judicial discretion led to a 1973
resolution passed at the Alaska Bar Association Conference calling
on the court to repeal Rule 82.
A 1974 law review article that summarized the history of Rule
82 as a follow-up to the 1973 Bar resolution said that
[t]he direct effect of Rule 82 is to give the trial judge complete
freedom to award any amount as an attorney's fee - or he can
choose to deny an award altogether .... This vast discretion...
is probably the principal problem with Rule 82, and one reason
why it may be repealed in the near future.43
The author characterized the numerous Rule 82 appeals primarily
as allegations that trial judges abused their discretion and suggested
that the supreme court had "little success in establishing standards
for the exercise of [trial] court[s'] discretion, possibly because every
case must be considered individually."'
41. Id.
42. Letter from N. C. Banfield, President of the Juneau Bar Association, to
Chief Justice Nesbett (Mar. 26, 1962) (on file with Court Rules Attorney). Mr.
Banfield stated:
After the present schedule was adopted by the judges of the United
States District Court for the Territory of Alaska, I personally discussed
the low percentages provided in the schedule with one of the judges. He
said that the schedule was purposely set very low to discourage litigation.
We have found it encourages litigation by encouraging a man who has no
defense to refuse to pay until after judgment.
Id.
43. Gregory Hughes, Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An
Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 129, 147 (1974).
44. Id. The author suggested changing Rule 82 so that it applied only to
successful plaintiffs in a series of circumstances in which other states already
practiced one-way fee shifting (e.g., small claims and public interest litigation). Id.
at 170-72. He supported attorney's fees awards as a sanction in bad faith cases
and in Rule 68 offers of judgment situations. He also recommended that the court
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Apparently, the passage of time dampened the Bar's enthusi-
asm for repealing the rule. On February 4, 1976, a letter from
Keith Brown, President of the Alaska Bar Association, to Chief
Justice Boochever cited a 1975 survey of the Bar's members as
grounds for the conclusion that "[no] concensus (sic) [existed]
among the Bar's membership" about Rule 82. Of the attorneys
responding to that survey, 121 (47%) favored repeal, and 136
(53%) did not.
In March 1992, the Alaska Supreme Court again asked the
chief justice to appoint a subcommittee of the Civil Rules Commit-
tee to review Civil Rule 82. The members of the court were
"concerned that the costs of litigation have increased to such an
extent that the prospect of an award of attorney's fees under Civil
Rule 82 may deter a broad spectrum of litigants from voluntary use
of the courts. ' 46  The subcommittee studied three issues: (1)
access to the courts; (2) lack of uniformity in fee awards when the
prevailing party does not receive a monetary judgment and (3)
absence of a requirement that trial judges articulate the reasons for
an award when the schedule does not apply.47 At the subcommit-
tee's first meeting, a majority of its members voted not to recom-
mend any changes to the existing rule. After the supreme court's
request for reconsideration and a survey of members of the Alaska
Bar,.' the subcommittee recommended revising Rule 82. The
or legislature limit judges' discretion and base the award on actual hours worked
multiplied by a competitive rate. Id. at 175-76.
45. Letter from Keith Brown, President of the Alaska Bar Association, to the
Honorable Robert Boochever, Chief Justice, Alaska Supreme Court 4 (Feb. 4,
1976) (on file with Court Rules Attorney).
46. Minutes of Civil Rules Committee, Mar. 25, 1992. The court confronted
this issue earlier in Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska
1992). The plaintiff in that case had lost a wrongful discharge suit against his
former employer and had been assessed $76,000 in attorney's fees under Rule 82.
Id. at 2-3. Bozarth appealed the fee award to the supreme court. While the
majority declined to grant Bozarth relief, they characterized the magnitude of the
award as "nonetheless disturbing." Id. at 4 n.3. The justices wondered whether
large fee awards could deter access to the courts and called on the Civil Rules
Committee to review the issue. Id.
47. Kevin M. Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in
Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 441-42 (1993).
48. The survey found that 80% of the 527 attorneys responding favored
keeping Rule 82; only 16% believed that the court should repeal it. Id. at 467.
Our own survey of attorneys for this evaluation of Rule 82 found that 73%
favored keeping the rule and 23% favored repeal, indicating that relatively little
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subcommittee suggested that the court use a fixed percentage of
reasonable fees incurred to calculate fee awards in non-monetary
judgment cases.4 9 It also recommended that the rule list factors
that the trial judge should consider in deviating from the schedule
or the fixed percentage."
Effective July 1993, the supreme court amended Rule 82 to
require judges to consider eleven factors in deciding whether to
depart from the schedule.5' The supreme court adopted most of
the subcommittee's recommendations but also added a factor to
address the Bozarth access issue.52 The current rule permits the
trial judge to vary a fee award calculated under the schedules after
considering "the extent to which a given fee award may be so
onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly
situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts."53 While
the rule does not specifically address a losing party's ability to pay,
one observer believed that judges might consider financial impact
in analyzing some cases. 54
The new rule contained other changes as well. For the first
time, it specified a fixed percentage of actual reasonable attorney's
change in opinion has occurred in the three-year period. See infra Part V.C. The
opinion of the Bar seems to have shifted toward a more positive view of Rule 82
over the two decades since the 1975 survey.
49. Kordziel, supra note 47, at 446.
50. Id. The subcommittee specifically rejected adding a factor to address the
Bozarth access issue, fearing that an ability-to-pay factor might generate
unnecessary litigation and undermine the rule's uniformity and fairness. Id.
51. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1118 (1993). The factors are complexity of the
litigation, length of trial, reasonableness of the attorneys' hourly rates and the
number of hours expended, reasonableness of the number of attorneys used,
attorneys' efforts to minimize fees, reasonableness of the claims and defenses on
each side, vexatious or bad faith conduct, relationship between the amount of
work performed and the significance of the matters at stake, extent to which a
given fee award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter
similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts, extent to which the
fees incurred by the prevailing party suggest that they had been influenced by
considerations apart from the case at bar and other relevant equitable factors.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(3). The court has said that the "change worked by the
new version of the Rule is merely to provide a set of guidelines to aid the court
in making its decisions, and to require that variations from the baseline award...
be explained in writing." Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149, 156
(Alaska 1995).
52. Kordziel, supra note 47, at 446; see also supra note 46 (discussing Bozarth).
53. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(3)(I).
54. Kordziel, supra note 47, at 451.
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fees for the trial judge to award in cases with no monetary
judgment." Under the old version of the rule, the judge would
first determine the total reasonable fee and then would choose a
percentage by which to multiply the total reasonable fee. 6 The
percentage multiplier could vary from 20% to 80%, depending on
such case-specific factors as the nature of the case and the results
achieved. 7
Under the new rule, the trial court multiplies the prevailing
party's actual, necessarily incurred fees by 20% if the case was
resolved without trial and 30% if it was resolved with trial. 8 The
Civil Rules Subcommittee suggested these fixed percentages
roughly to equalize the recovery available between plaintiffs and
defendants in certain cases.59 However, the result still will vary in
many cases, leaving inequities between plaintiff and defendant
reimbursements that bother many attomeys.:
55. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
56. A.J. TOMKINS & T.E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATrORNEYS' FEES:
PRAcricEs IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS 42-43 (1986).
57. Id. at 43 n.152. Commenting on the discretion afforded by this provision,
one author observed that "[a]wards between 20 percent and 80 percent of actual
defense fees are, as a practical matter, not reversible." Andrew J. Kleinfeld,
Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner's Fees, 24 JuDGES' J., Spring 1985, at 4,
6 (1985).
58. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
59. Minutes, Meeting of Subcommittee to Review Civil Rule 82, July 7, 1992.
"Approximately half of the subcommittee recommended 30 percent and half
recommended 35 percent. (Thirty to 35 percent is roughly comparable to the
percentage of actual fees that a prevailing party recovers in a larger case under the
schedule in Rule 82(a)(1)). There was one vote for 25 percent." Id.
60. If the case resulted in a monetary judgment of $100,000 after trial, the
plaintiff would recover approximately $5,000 + $7,500 = $12,500 (20% of the first
$25,000, and 10% of the next $75,000) on a Rule 82 award from the schedule. If
the plaintiff's attorney had taken the case on a standard one-third contingent fee
contract, the plaintiff would owe the attorney $33,300 in fees, of which the non-
prevailing party would presumably pay about one-third. If, in the same case
(assuming one could project the probable value at $100,000), the defendant
prevailed, the court would award the defendant 30% of the actual fees. If the
defendant had spent $100,000 in defending the case, the court (following the
schedule) would award $33,300, or nearly three times the award to the plaintiff.
It is not clear why the court has maintained the distinction between plaintiff
and defendant as prevailing parties in calculating awards. One author says that
"[o]ne attorney estimated that in the vast majority of small cases, thirty percent
of the actual defense fees will far exceed the amount of attorney fees the
prevailing plaintiff can recoup under the schedule .... [T]he amendment may fail
to redress adequately the inherent asymmetry between the schedule and fixed-rate
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C. Purposes of Rule 82
The main purpose of Rule 82 is partially to compensate a
prevailing party for the productive work done by his or her
attorney.6' The Alaska Supreme Court first stated this purpose in
1964, noting that "[t]he rule was not designed to be used capri-
ciously or arbitrarily, or as a vehicle for accomplishing any purpose
other than providing compensation where it is justified."'62 The
court viewed the risk that a plaintiff would become liable for "the
full amount of attorney's fees the other side sees fit to incur" as
creating a situation in which "the size of a party's bank account will
have a major impact on his access to the courts."'63 The court
most recently acknowledged the tension between the purpose of
partial compensation to the prevailing party and access to the
courts in Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.,' after which it
revised Rule 82 in part to address the problem of large awards
creating a chilling effect on access to the courts.65
Soon after the rule's adoption, the supreme court permitted
trial courts to use it for other purposes, approving the possibility of
full fee awards in some circumstances.66 The losing party's bad
faith or vexatious conduct could warrant a full fee award,67 as
would frivolous claims.68 It is not entirely clear from the court's
methods of fee taxation for plaintiffs and defendants respectively." Kordziel,
supra note 47, at 450 (citation omitted).
61. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska 1979); Malvo v. J.C.
Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 731
(Alaska 1972); Preferred Gen. Agency of Alaska, Inc. v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951,
954 (Alaska 1964).
62. Preferred General Agency, 391 P.2d at 954.
63. Malvo, 512 P.2d at 587.
64. 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992).
65. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, 499 P.2d 599, 602 n.13
(Alaska 1972) (mentioning the possibility of partial denial of fees "in an extreme
case of a vexatious prevailing party unreasonably prolonging the litigation and
substantially increasing its costs" (emphasis added)).
67. Horton v. Hansen, 722 P.2d 211, 218 (1986) (affirming full fee award on
trial court's findings that defendant's distortion of the facts was "abnormal" and
that his misconduct caused plaintiff "to incur costly attorney's fees in a wasteful
effort to reconstruct... business records").
68. Steenmeyer Corp. v. Mortenson-Neal, 731 P.2d 1221, 1226-27 (Alaska
1987) (upholding trial court award of 75% of actual fees because losing party's
defense "border[ed] on the frivolous"); see also Estate of Brandon, 902 P.2d 1299,
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opinions in these areas whether the full fee awards are justified as
a punishment for the bad conduct or frivolous filing, or whether
they are intended merely to compensate the non-offending party
fully for litigation costs incurred as a result of such behavior.69
Under either rationale, the court has implicitly sanctioned full
compensation as an additional effect of Rule 82.
The supreme court also has cited as a goal of Rule 82 the
encouragement of settlements for attorney fee awards governed by
Civil Rule 68, the offer of judgment rule.70 In Miklautsch v.
Dominick,7 the court first explained the purpose of fee awards in
the context of Rule 68. The trial court in Miklautsch awarded
attorney's fees to the plaintiff-appellee, who had rejected a $2,500
offer of judgment and who, despite receiving a directed verdict on
liability, was awarded no damages at trial. The supreme court
overturned the fee award, holding that the plaintiff-appellee's
failure to better the unaccepted Rule 68 offer precluded her from
being the prevailing party under Rule 68, even though she had
prevailed on liability.' The court said that "[t]he purpose of Civil
Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of civil litigation, as well as
to avoid protracted litigation. In our view, adoption of [Rule 82's]
'prevailing party' criterion in the resolution of Rule 68 issues
defeats the very purposes which led to the promulgation of the
1312 (Alaska 1995) (noting that failure of attorney to litigate a very strong claim
might have deprived estate's young heiress of a potential award of full attorney's
fees under Rule 82, because any defense to that claim would have been "frivo-
lous"); Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987) (reversing
the superior court's denial of Rule 82 attorney's fees and instructing court to
consider a full fee award on remand because suit was frivolous); State v.
University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 817-18 (Alaska 1981) (overturning trial court's
award of 90% of what university requested because "there [wa]s no evidence that
the state's claim was frivolous, vexatious or devoid of good faith").
69. In Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska 1979), the court commented
that it "intend[s] fee awards [under Rule 82] to be compensatory rather than
punitive." However, in Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1982), the
court permitted a Rule 82 award in an admiralty case because the purpose of Rule
82 was "remedial." At the same time, the court has emphasized that Rule 82 was
not intended to penalize a losing party for litigating a good faith claim. Gilbert
v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974); Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d
575, 588 (Alaska 1973).
70. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 68.
71. 452 P.2d 438 (Alaska 1969).
72. Id. at 438-39.
73. Id. at 440.
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rule."'74 In a subsequent Rule 68 case, Continental Insurance Co.
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,7 the court again insisted
that trial judges tailor fee awards in Rule 68 cases to encourage
settlement. In that case, the supreme court declined to require trial
court judges to award pre-offer attorney's fees in all instances,
because to do so would "encourage litigation and discourage
settlement, thereby defeating the intent underlying Civil Rule
68."76
III. THE MECHANICS OF RULE 82
This Part describes the mechanics of Rule 82's operation. It
combines a discussion of the rule's legal requirements with data
taken from judge and attorney interviews and from state and
federal case files. In addition, after each description of the rule's
legal requirements, it lists representative responses of attorneys and
judges to questions about the practical effect of these require-
ments.
77
A. The Motion Requirement
Rule 82 requires that a party move for an award of fees no
later than ten days after the date shown on the certificate of
distribution on the judgment The opposing party has ten days
to file an opposition to the motion.79 Many attorneys described
Rule 82 motion practice as routine, while others believed it was
excessively contentious. Most practitioners described the motions
themselves as "pro forma" or "cookbook" and were content simply
to request the amounts set forth in the schedule. One noted, "I
have the standard motion and the standard opposition." Descrip-
74. Id. at 441.
75. 552 P.2d 1122 (Alaska 1976).
76. Id. at 1126.
77. We interviewed 161 attorneys about their practices in state and federal
courts, seven attorneys who concentrated their practices in federal courts, all of the
Anchorage trial court judges, the five Alaska Supreme Court Justices and
seventeen attorneys with specialized practices in public interest law and insurance
company representation. We also talked with five federal judges, one bankruptcy
judge and two magistrates. For a full description of how attorneys and judges
were selected to be interviewed, as well as the questions that were asked, see AJC,
ALAsKA'S ENGLIsH RULE, supra note *, at app. A & B.
78. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(c). Failure to make a timely motion for attorney's
fees is construed as a waiver of the party's right to recover. Id.
79. ALAsKA R. Crv. P. 77(c).
1996]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
tions of motion practice as routine were consistent with the results
of a 1986 study that found that the losing party rarely opposed the
fee request."0
However, other attorneys reported that they routinely tried to
"beat the schedule" or to "get a bump if you can." An attorney
who handled plaintiffs' employment and wrongful termination cases
said he regularly asked for more than the schedule permits in order
to make up for the small recoveries available to plaintiffs who can
mitigate their damages in wrongful termination cases. Those who
asked for enhanced fees tended to agree with Justice Rabinowitz's
view that conscientious attorneys will seek variances." While few
thought that explicitly enumerating the exceptions encouraged
excessive litigation, one attorney believed that the court should
eliminate the enhancement/variance process because it was "a large
drain on attorney time." He added, "the mudslinging that goes on
post-trial is really pretty bad. One of the most unpleasant areas of
practicing law is post-trial. Very unpleasant." Another practitioner
described the process as "vicious."
Trial court judges also were asked about changes in motion
practice since the 1993 amendments. Almost all of the judges felt
that the frequency of motion practice had "remained about the
same." None thought that it had increased. One judge who
thought it had decreased explained that "with respect to nonmone-
tary judgments, attorneys now know what they are entitled to, and
they don't spend much time arguing that they should get 80% [of
their actual fees]."
Examination of Rule 82 motion practice in the federal and
state courts supported the perception that fee shifting was fairly
80. See TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 56, at 41. This monograph
discusses Alaska procedures in some detail, based on interviews with Alaska
superior court judges, literature review and other sources. The authors note that
"[f]ee shifting is such an accepted part of Alaskan legal culture that there is
typically no opposition to schedule-based fee awards." Id.
81. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 note (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) ("My judicial
hunch is that these amendments[,] ... in particular the new provisions reflected
in (b)(3)(A) through (K), will unnecessarily and dramatically increase litigation
over attorney's fees awards both in our trial courts as well as in this court ....
Any attorney worth his or her salt will, pursuant to the expansive provisions of
(b)(3)(A) through (K), request variations from the attorney's fees awards called
for under either the monetary recovery schedule provisions of (b)(1), or the
provisions of (b)(2) which apply where no money judgment is recovered by the
prevailing party.").
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routine and occurred with relatively little written motion work.
Although about 10% of state cases contained Rule 82 awards, only
6% had written motions asking for attorney's fees. Only about 3%
of the state cases contained a Rule 82 request in a specific
amount.' Of the cases with motions for attorney's fees, the great
majority (82%) had only one such motion s3 All federal cases
containing a Rule 82 award had at least one written motion
requesting attorney's fees. The greater number of written motions
in federal cases was expected, since the amount of written work
generally is greater in federal than state court.'
B. Calculating Fee Awards
One issue for jurisdictions considering fee shifting is how to
calculate fees. For the prevailing party, Rule 82 uses a percentage
of the judgment for cases involving a money judgment and a
percentage of actual, reasonable fees for cases not involving a
money judgment. The supreme court sets the Rule 82 schedules.
When a prevailing party recovers a money judgment, the judge
usually calculates the award based on the schedule in Rule
82(b)(1). He or she computes schedule-based fee awards on net
rather than gross recovery.'5 The amount of the "money judg-
82. Cross-tabulations showed that where a specific amount was requested,
judges usually awarded an amount close to the amount requested. For example,
70% of the time that the prevailing party requested an award between $1,000 and
$5,000, the award fell in that range. Similarly, 70% of the time that the prevailing
party requested more than $5,000, the award exceeded $5,000.
83. Approximately 15% contained two attorney's fee motions. Three cases
had three motions, and one case had six motions.
84. See Herbert W. Kritzer et al., Courts and Litigation Investment Why Do
Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 JusT. SYs. J. 7, 8 (1984). The
authors found that hourly fee attorneys spent considerably more time on cases that
they took to federal court than on cases in state court. These differences did not
hold true for lawyers working on a contingent fee basis. The authors note that
"for these lawyers, their time is their money (rather than their clients' money) and
it may well be that because of the economic incentives associated with their work
they (successfully) resist the temptation to differentiate between the two types of
courts in deciding how much effort to put into their cases." Id at 17.
85. Fairbanks Builders, Inc. v. Sandstrom Plumbing & Heating, 555 P.2d 964,
967 (Alaska 1976); see also TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 56, at 42
(commenting that judges told them that computing a schedule-based fee award
rarely took more than ten minutes and that more than 80% of their cases used the
schedule).
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ment" includes any prejudgment interest award.86 The court can
include punitive damages in the "amount recovered" for purposes
of calculating Rule 82 attorney's fees. If it does not, it must state
the reason for not doing so on the record.87 The supreme court
presumes that attorney's fee awards made pursuant to the schedule
are correct88 and does not require an explanation for these
awards.89 A prevailing party who asks for fees based on the
schedule need not submit documents to support the requestY
Interviews with judges also suggested that they found Rule 82
motions routine and applied the rule with little effort. For cases in
which the prevailing party won a monetary judgment, almost all of
the judges looked to the schedule and applied the appropriate
multiplier without any further analysis. One judge reported that he
also "glances at the list" of reasons allowing variance from the
schedule in Rule 82(b)(3) before making the award. Another judge
made an exception in collections cases where an attorney tries the
case instead of moving for summary judgment. If the judge
determined that the attorney had put in "very little work," he
awarded a percentage of actual fees instead of a percentage of the
monetary judgment. If the trial court departs from the schedule in
a contested case with a monetary judgment, it must state reasons
for the departure.9' In cases with default judgments, the clerk of
court may determine attorney's fee awards,' but for amounts over
$50,000, the prevailing party must specify actual fees.93
Sometimes a prevailing party does not recover a monetary
judgment. Occasionally, plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief. More
often, if a defendant prevails, the court disposes of the case through
dismissal or a verdict for the defendant without awarding monetary
86. Era Helicopters v. Digicon Alaska, 518 P.2d 1057, 1063 (Alaska 1974).
87. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 627 P.2d 204,205 n.1 (Alaska 1981) (reasoning
that denying attorney's fees as to punitive damages would be unreasonable in tort
cases, such as defamation, where actual damages are nominal but punitives are
substantial).
88. Babinec v. Yabuki, 799 P.2d 1325, 1337 (Alaska 1990).
89. Alaska Airlines v. Sweat, 584 P.2d 544, 551 (Alaska 1978).
90. Babinec, 799 P.2d at 1337; Korean Air Lines v. State, 779 P.2d 333, 340
(Alaska 1989). Tomkins & Willging found that the trial court handled most
schedule-based fee awards as routine motions. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note
56, at 41.
91. Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169, 178-79 (Alaska 1966).
92. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(d).
93. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(c).
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judgment. In these cases, the rule directs the trial court to compute
the prevailing party's attorney's fee award as a percentage of the
fees the prevailing party actually incurred.94
Under the old version of the rule,9" the judge first decided the
total reasonable fee and then chose a reasonable percentage by
which to multiply this amount.96 Judges chose multipliers ranging
from 20% to 80%, depending on the judge, the nature of the case
and the results achieved. 7 The court first specified the percentage
of actual fees to award to a prevailing party with a non-monetary
judgment in the 1993 amendments. Currently, the judge must
decide which of the prevailing party's fees were "necessarily
incurred," excluding duplicative and unnecessary work, before
applying the specified percentage.9" The amount of damages
sought by the unsuccessful plaintiff does not limit a prevailing
defendant's fee recovery. 99
Judges generally reported spending more time and engaging in
more analysis on non-monetary judgment fee awards. For example,
eleven judges said they regularly analyzed the need for the legal
services reported. Even the remaining seven judges in our study
said they did analyze them "if the other side protests" or "if they
appear on their face to be excessive."
The supreme court requires counsel for the prevailing party to
submit accurate records of the hours expended and briefly to
94. The rule states:
In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no money judgment, the
court shall award the prevailing party in a case which goes to trial 30
percent of the prevailing party's actual attorney's fees which were
necessarily incurred, and shall award the prevailing party in a case
resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees which were
necessarily incurred. The actual fees shall include fees for legal work
customarily performed by an attorney but which was delegated to and
performed by an investigator, paralegal or law clerk.
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
95. ALASKA R. Crv. P. 82(a)(2) (1982).
96. ToMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 56, at 43.
97. Id. at 43 n.152. This wide range of discretion probably led to an Alaska
Bar resolution in 1973 calling for abolition of Rule 82. See supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text.
98. State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 621 P.2d 1329, 1335
(Alaska 1981).
99. Stevens v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 396 (Alaska 1988) (reasoning that
"[e]ven a claim for a small amount of damages may be expensive to defend").
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describe the services provided.'" Attorneys usually rely on
affidavits that summarize billing rates, number of hours spent and
who worked on which matters.'' Some attorneys also submit
copies of the bills they sent to their clients." 2 Ten judges said
they required or preferred that the prevailing party submit copies
of actual billings. Judges who did not require actual billings still
scrutinized the affidavits submitted with the fee requests. They
looked for "duplication of services," "padding," "hourly break-
downs" and "paralegals doing purely clerical tasks." Judges noted
in interviews that they typically review these affidavits and make
the fee decisions without the help of a court clerk or other
assistant.113
Despite the increased scrutiny that most judges applied to
awards in nonmonetary cases, few complained that the work took
up too much time or was unduly burdensome. One judge ob-
served, "the motions seldom are long, because the parties are tired
by then." However, another judge believed that Rule 82 took "a
substantial amount of time" and stated that getting rid of it would
"speed up the process."
As with fee awards based on money judgments, the trial court
can exercise broad discretion, including not awarding attorney's
fees to a prevailing party, but the court must state the reason for
its decision." 4  The supreme court allows,' but does not re-
quire, the judge to apportion fees based on degree of success on
specific issues, reasoning that Rule 82 "already takes into account
the degree of success at the initial stage of determining prevailing
100. Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 939 (Alaska 1986) (citing Moses v.
McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363, 1374 n.32 (Alaska 1980)).
101. See id. at 939.
102. ToMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 56, at 41.
103. Judges interviewed by Tomkins & Wiliging concurred. See id. Judges'
decisions about reasonable fees in non-monetary judgments have generated
perhaps more controversy about the rule than any other specific aspect. In Alvey
v. Pioneer Oilfield Serv., Inc., 648 P.2d 599, 601 (Alaska 1982), the defendant, who
prevailed on summary judgment, cross-appealed to the supreme court. The court
said that "Pioneer claims that the superior court's award 'was apparently set at a
very low rate to encourage this appeal' and to obtain thereby 'better defined
guidelines' for the determination of costs and fees." IL at 601 n.1.
104. Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 68 (Alaska
1977).
105. Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 868 P.2d 919, 926 (Alaska 1994); Alaska
State Bank v. General Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1362, 1369 (Alaska 1978).
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party status."' 6
C. Departures from Schedules
Before the 1993 amendments, the supreme court allowed the
trial judge to vary the fee award at a party's request but did not
require the judge to limit the award to the amount requested. °7
If the judge decided to vary an award, he or she calculated the
award authorized by the schedule and then stated the reasons for
deviating from that amount.'08 The supreme court required this
procedure to assure a rational basis for departure and a sound
record for review on appeal.'"
The supreme court's 1993 amendments to Rule 82 required
consideration of eleven factors before the trial court could depart
from the scheduled recovery rates."0 The subcommittee appoint-
ed to study the rule recommended these factors to increase
uniformity by "codifying" some of the reasons most often argued
by attorneys as justifying a variance. To date, the supreme court
has published only one case interpreting the 1993 amendments,"'
so it remains unclear how the factors will affect existing case
law." Judges described the variance decision as a "party-
106. Hickel, 868 P.2d at 929; see also Gold Bondholders Protective Council v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 658 P.2d 776, 779 (Alaska 1983).
107. State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 621 P.2d 1329, 1335
(Alaska 1981).
108. Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368,1373 n.7 (Alaska 1991). In Kowalski,
the supreme court overturned the trial court's award of full attorney's fees because
the trial court had not first determined what fee award would be appropriate
under the general rule before increasing the award to account for a party's
misconduct. Id. at 1372-73. The supreme court instructed the trial court to use
this two-step process on remand and added that "[ilncreased attorney's fee awards
under Alaska Civil Rule 82 are subject to the same requirements. The court must
first calculate what award is authorized under the schedule... and then state its
reasons for deviating from that award." L at 1373 n.7.
109. Fairbanks Builders, Inc. v. Sandstrom Plumbing & Heating, 555 P.2d 964,
966 (Alaska 1976).
110. ALAsKA R. CIv. P. 82(b)(3); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
111. Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149, 155-56 (Alaska 1995).
112. In a note to its order amending the rule, the court expressly denied that
it intended by adopting the amendments to change the law regarding public
interest litigants or the rule that full fees are manifestly unreasonable in the
absence of bad faith or vexatious conduct. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1118, at 4.
This note did not mention frivolous conduct as a reason to uphold full fee awards,
despite the court's line of decisions permitting full fees in cases of frivolous
conduct. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Still, the amendments do
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propelled issue;" they generally did not consider departing from the
schedule unless a party so requested.
The rule does not specify how much the judge should vary the
award from the schedule if a reason for variance is found, but
judges did not find this detail to be a problem. Most judges said
they simply went "down the list" of reasons to grant a variance and
decided how much to vary based on their own knowledge of the
case, "a gut feeling" or their prior private practice experience.
Judges agreed that by the time a party filed a Rule 82 motion, they
usually had a good sense of the relevant factors and were close
enough to the case to make the decision simple.
The data and interviews suggested that variances were
uncommon. A few judges said that they had "never" diverged
from the schedule in the past year, and others reported anywhere
from six to twelve variances in the past year. In nearly 92% of the
cases with fee awards from the state court sample, judges calculated
fee awards according to the schedules set out in the rule.' In
only one of the federal cases did a judge vary from the sched-
ule."4 However, the attorney interview data differed somewhat
from the case file data on the frequency with which fee awards
varied from the scheduled amounts; attorneys claimed that judges
awarded fees according to the schedule only 64% of the time."5
In the past, the supreme court has emphasized the need for
trial courts to state findings that support departures from the
schedule." 6 In Bowman v. Blair,"7 the court held that when a
raise the question of whether the court will allow variations for reasons other than
those explicitly mentioned in Rule 82(b)(3).
113. For detailed discussions of the data and analysis, see infra Part IV. The
weighted state court case sample included all civil cases closed in 1993 in
Anchorage except domestic relations and debt cases. Courts awarded Rule 82 fees
in only 10% of those cases.
114. Fee awards were made in twenty of the 359 federal cases.
115. This may represent an important difference in how judges and attorneys
see the rule in practice. Throughout the life of the rule, one of the Bar's primary
complaints has been that judges have too much discretion. Many of the changes
made by the supreme court have limited judicial discretion. Nonetheless, attorneys
still believed that judges varied from the schedule more frequently than they
actually did.
116. Under previous case law, judges had to state reasons for variation on the
record. See, e.g., Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 939 (Alaska 1986); Stordahl
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 68 (Alaska 1977); Patrick v.
Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169, 179 (Alaska 1966). In the past, the court accepted an oral
explanation on the record, Larry v. Dupree, 580 P.2d 326, 327 (Alaska 1978), but
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trial court varied the attorney's fee award from the standards
prescribed in the rule, the judge must explain the variance.""
Data collected for this Article suggested that judges explained
their decisions to grant variances and that they granted variances
based only on the eleven factors set out in Rule 82(b)(3). Eleven
judges said that within the past year, they had granted variances
based on "other equitable factors," "reasonableness of defenses and
claims" made by both sides and "vexatious or bad faith con-
duct.""' 9 The next most common grounds for departure were
"relationship between the amount of work and the significance of
the matters at stake,"'" "complexity of the case," "reasonableness
of the hourly rate and the number of hours expended" and
"attorneys' efforts to minimize fees." Five judges had varied an
award based on "reasonableness of number of attorneys;" four had
cited "outside considerations" and three had cited "length of trial."
In the thirty-three cases in which attorneys reported a
departure from the schedule, they most often claimed that the
variance was granted based on "other equitable factors," litigants'
that statement had to be specific. See Curran v. Hastreiter, 579 P.2d 524, 530-31
(Alaska 1978) (concluding that judge's statement that "[u]nder the circumstances,
justice will best be served if each party bears [its] own costs and attorney's fees"
was not sufficient). One case decided under the new version of the rule suggested
that the court will continue to look for reasons for variation in the record. See
Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149,156 (Alaska 1995) (stating that
the change worked by the new rule requires "that variations from the baseline
award... be explained in writing").
117. 889 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1995).
118. The court also held that when a prevailing party asks to have the fee award
enhanced, the non-prevailing party must have a chance to oppose the enhance-
ment. Id. at 1075. In Bowman, the personal representative of an intestate
decedent's estate filed an action to decide claims to property held by the
decedent's girlfriend. After a lengthy hearing, the probate master found in favor
of the girlfriend and awarded her 50% of the attorney's fees she actually incurred.
In making the 50% award under Rule 82(b)(3), the probate master cited the
extensive hearing time and the volume of documents produced. The Alaska
Supreme Court remanded the attorney's fee award because the appellant had not
had a chance to respond, although it noted that it previously had upheld awards
in excess of 50% based on factors such as those cited by the probate master. Id.
at 1075 n.10.
119. Three of the judges noted that attorneys requested variances based on bad
faith or vexatious conduct much more often than judges granted variances. One
commented, "it's raised a lot but seldom prevails."
120. However, one state district court judge commented, "I don't use this factor
because it's hardly ever worth it to fight all the way [through trial]."
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vexatious conduct, complexity of the litigation and the reasonable-
ness of the claims and defenses asserted. Length of trial was cited
in one case. Variances from the schedule were somewhat related
to whether the attorney represented plaintiff or defendant.
Attorneys who represented defendants received awards not
calculated from the schedules slightly more often than plaintiffs'
attorneys.
The 1993 amendments are unlikely to affect the supreme
court's refusal to allow the trial judge to depart from the schedule
based on informal settlement offers. In Myers v. Snow White
Cleaners & Linen Supply,' the trial court used past settlement
negotiations to justify reducing the amount of attorney's fees it
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff."2  The supreme court re-
versed the fee award on appeal, holding that Civil Rule 68
exclusively "controls whether a trial court can penalize a party for
its refusal to settle prior to trial when the jury verdict awards an
amount of money virtually identical to the pre-trial offer.""
D. Effect on Insurance Coverage Cases
Our interviews revealed that insurance coverage cases in
Alaska are a type of litigation uniquely created by Rule 82.12
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that insurance contracts
covering unlimited court costs obligate the insurer to pay Rule 82
fees calculated on the full amount of a projected jury verdict
rendered against an insured defendant."z Because Rule 82 fees
121. 770 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1989).
122. Id. at 751.
123. Id. at 752. The offer of judgment in this case was defective under Rule 68.
Id. In a similar case, the supreme court reversed the trial court's fee award
because the trial court relied on, among other things, the defendant's "ridiculously
low" settlement offers to justify a fee award that exceeded the scheduled amount.
Van Dort v. Culliton, 797 P.2d 642, 645 (Alaska 1990).
124. See Gerald Z. Marer & John F. Schuck, Alaska's Rule 82 Fees: A Trap for
Unwary Insurers, 57 DEF. COUNSEL J. 214 (1990).
125. Schultz v. Travelers Indem. Co., 754 P.2d 265, 267 (Alaska 1988); Guin v.
Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Alaska 1979). The insurer's obligation to tender for
settlement the maximum limits of insurance coverage is grounded in the insurer's
legal duty to act in good faith to protect the interests of the insured. Schultz, 754
P.2d at 266-67. Marer & Schuck warn that "a company writing any type of
liability policy in any of the other 49 states, can find itself paying many times the
amount of policy limits if its insured is sued under Alaska law, depending on the
jury's award of damages or even the amount of a settlement." Marer & Schuck,
supra note 124, at 214.
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can cause a claim to exceed the face value of the policy, insurance
companies have sought to exclude attorney's fees from their policy
coverage. Many claimants have challenged the validity of those
exclusions. Attorneys identified policy coverage disputes as a
significant source of litigation. A personal injury insurance defense
attorney said, "We always have to consider: Does the policy limit
Rule [82 fees] to the face value of the policy, and is the limitation
effective?" Another attorney recognized the issue but said that
"most insurance companies have figured out how to write effective
exclusions by now.""
Still, insurance defense attorneys consistently reported
spending time researching and negotiating coverage issues. One
insurance defense attorney reported spending 1% to 2% of his time
researching and negotiating Rule 82 coverage issues and said that
the rule created "big stakes problems" when interpreting policy
limits, with policy limit issues "always a sticking point" in settle-
ment negotiations. A personal injury attorney estimated that half
of his Rule 82 practice centered on the insurance policy coverage
question; another said coverage issues arose in his practice "twelve
times a year." An attorney who handled both insurance defense
and plaintiffs' personal injury cases reported that most of his
federal practice involved diversity cases litigating the validity of the
insurance company's Rule 82 endorsement.
In about four cases, attorneys told us how Rule 82 had
increased the settlement value beyond the face value of the
insurance policy limit. One case involved an injured plaintiff
seeking to recover under an insurance policy that limited coverage
to $50,000. However, the plaintiff's damages equaled or exceeded
the face value of the policy. If plaintiff's counsel had made a
"policy limits" demand and the insurance company had accepted
the settlement offer, the insurance company would have paid the
126. Under ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 29.010 (July 1993), insurance
companies could limit their Rule 82 exposure by making full disclosure to the
insured. In the Fall of 1995, the Alaska Division of Insurance issued a proposed
order to repeal section 29.010 and replace it with a regulation that seemed to be
more specific as to exactly what language insurance companies could use to notify
their insureds of limitation of Rule 82 coverage (Proposed Order on file with the
Alaska Judicial Council). The Attorney General's office was reviewing the
proposed order in September 1995. Telephone Conversation with Assistant
Attorney General Signe Anderson, Sept. 11, 1995. The order was to become
effective in January 1996, but the regulation has not yet been amended as of the
date of this Article's publication.
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policy limit ($50,000) plus a Rule 82 award. 7 In this case,
plaintiff's. counsel demanded the face value of the policy ($50,000)
plus 10% of the projected verdict if the case had gone to trial
(damages were estimated at $250,000).' 2' The case eventually
settled for more than $50,000.
Attorneys who represented insurance companies identified this
scenario as an important way that Rule 82 affected their clients'
decisions about when to settle a case and how much to offer. As
one defense attorney recalled, "After I explained about Rule 82
and policy limits, [the insurance company] followed my recommen-
dations to pay and settled." A plaintiff's attorney explained, "The
insurance company pays Rule 82 fees on top of the policy, and they
don't want to pay any more. The rule tells them they have to pay
attention. It makes bad boys behave."
E. Collection of Rule 82 Awards-Transformation of Two-Way
Shift into One-Way Shift
The most frequent criticism of Rule 82 by personal injury
defense attorneys was that they could not collect fee awards from
the losing plaintiffs. Insurance personal injury defense attorneys
said that successful defendants rarely can collect fee awards from
plaintiffs, while plaintiffs "always" get their fee awards paid by the
"deep pocket" defendant. One attorney commented, "Plaintiffs
don't pay, and so [the rule] only works one way. When we... try
to collect our Rule 82 award, we're seen as ogres." A medical
malpractice defense attorney with more than ten years experience
could recall only one instance in which an unsuccessful plaintiff had
the resources to warrant the defendant's attempt to collect a Rule
82 judgment. He said, "My client was so angry at the plaintiff's
conduct in the case that he asked me to try to collect the judgment.
The plaintiff ended up declaring bankruptcy." Another personal
injury insurance defense attorney could not think of a single case
in which liability was questionable and the plaintiff had any assets
at all. Only twice in his eight-year career had he "bothered going
after a plaintiff to satisfy a Rule 82 judgment." Yet another
personal injury defense attorney said in almost twenty years of
experience that he "had witnessed no more than five instances in
127. Schultz, 754 P.2d at 267; Guin 591 P.2d at 1285-86. If the plaintiff had
accepted the offer, the court probably would have awarded about $3,250 in Rule
82 fees. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(1).
128. See ALAsKA. R. Civ. P. 82(b)(1).
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which prevailing defendants have collected their Rule 82 awards."
The attorney interview data supported the defense attorneys'
observations but revealed a variety of other reasons that made fee
awards uncollectible. Of the 57 cases in the attorney interview
sample in which fees were awarded and the attorneys knew
whether they had been paid, in 40% the fees had been paid, and in
60% the fees had not been paid. 29 Twenty-one of the 57 cases
were tort cases (malpractice, admiralty, personal injury, auto
accidents and fraud), and defendants prevailed in fourteen of those
twenty-one cases (67%). Of the fourteen cases in which the
defendant prevailed, the fee award was collected in only four. In
a fifth case, the losing plaintiff's attorney reported that his client
will pay the fee award to the defendant. Of the remaining nine
cases, two settled with a waiver of fees, the judgment in one was
assigned, two others were on appeal, and in the remaining four, the
plaintiff was judgment-proof.
On the other hand, some attorneys are more creative in their
collection attempts than others. One personal injury defense
attorney with more than two decades of litigation experience
reported that he collects at least some part of a Rule 82 award for
his insurance clients "about 40% of the time."'30 To illustrate, he
gave the example of an unsuccessful plaintiff with "four or five
kids" who is "sending [him] $50 a month."''
F. Public Interest Litigation
Fee shifting in public interest cases occurs in many jurisdictions
through statutes. 32 Many courts have interpreted statutory
provisions for fee awards to public interest litigants as evincing
legislative intent to create an exception to the American rule. The
U.S. Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion with respect to the
129. Forty attorneys said they did not know whether the fee award had been
satisfied. Some did not know because their motions were pending at the time of
the interview and some because other attorneys or paralegals handled the
collection of judgments.
130. This was the attorney who had assigned his fee award to a creditor of the
losing plaintiff.
131. This attorney criticized the loser pays rule, among other reasons, because
"when it does apply to plaintiffs it often causes personal tragedies."
132. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, supra note 14, at 343 (noting that
"80.5% of all public interest attorney fee shifting statutes have been enacted since
1960[, and] the percentage of public interest statutes as compared to the other
statutes is growing").
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Civil Rights Act of 1964." The Alaska Supreme Court first
explicitly acknowledged a public interest exception to Rule 82 in
Gilbert v. State,"M in which it announced that attorney's fees will
not be awarded against "a losing party who has in good faith raised
a question of genuine public interest before the courts." The
plaintiff in Gilbert unsuccessfully challenged the state's residency
requirements for election to legislative office. On appeal, he
argued that Rule 82 would deter citizens from litigating questions
of general public concern for fear of having to pay the other party's
attorney's fees. 35 The court agreed, reiterating that the purpose
of Rule 82 is not to penalize a party for litigating a good faith
claim.
136
In Municipality of Anchorage v. McCabe, 7 the supreme
court established that prevailing public interest plaintiffs are
entitled to full reasonable attorney's fees. In McCabe, homeowner
plaintiffs prevailed in a suit against the Municipality of Anchorage
133. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400,401 (1968) (holding that Title
II's provision of "a reasonable attorney's fee" to the prevailing party should not
be limited to circumstances in which the losing party's "defenses had been
advanced for purposes of delay and not in good faith" (citations omitted)); see also
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) (stating that
by enacting fee shifting statutes, "[c]ongress has opted to rely heavily on private
enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to
encourage private litigation").
134. 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974). A litigant must satisfy four criteria to
qualify for the public interest attorney fee exception. First, the case must be
designed to effectuate strong public policies; second, numerous people must be
expected to benefit if the plaintiff succeeds; third, the suit must be expected to be
brought by a private party; and, fourth, there must be sufficient economic incentive
for the purported public interest litigant to file the suit even if the action involved
only narrow issues lacking general importance. Anchorage Daily News v.
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 1990). The court articulated the
first three points in Municipality of Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska
1977) and added the fourth in Kenai Lumber Co., Inc. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215,
223 (Alaska 1982) ("[T]he fourth criterion may be expressed as whether the
litigant claiming public interest status would have had sufficient economic incentive
to bring the lawsuit even if it involved only narrow issues lacking general
importance. Such a litigant is less apt than a party lacking this incentive to be
deterred from bringing a good faith claim by the prospect of an adverse award of
attorney's fees."); see also Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska
1988).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973)).
137. 568 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1977).
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and received full fees under Rule 82.38 The court refused to
overturn the trial court's award of full fees, reasoning that a full fee
award was necessary to ensure that the public interest plaintiff,
acting as "a 'private attorney general,"' is not "penalized by Rule
82 by failing to receive full compensation for the costs of litigating
issues of public importance."'39 While trial courts retain the
discretion to award less than all fees requested by a public interest
plaintiff, they may not reduce the award in order to discourage
public interest litigation or to penalize a plaintiff acting as a private
attorney general.41
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A. Litigation Trends
One question addressed by this Article is how Alaska's system
of civil litigation compares to litigation in states that do not shift
attorney's fees. Does any evidence suggest that Alaskans go to
court more or less often than people from states without fee
shifting? This sub-part examines case filings, types of cases and
trials in Alaska courts and nationwide to determine whether Alaska
differs significantly on these measures from other states.
1. Civil Case Filings. Civil case filing rates in Alaska were
compared to rates in states that do not shift fees to assess whether
attorney fee shifting affects the rate of civil case filing. If fee
shifting had strongly pronounced deterrent effects, one would
expect a lower rate of civil case filings, on the hypothesis that fee
shifting discouraged some potential plaintiffs from filing cases. Yet,
Alaska's per capita civil filing rate did not seem to differ substan-
tially from rates across the nation. For example, Alaska's 5,793
civil filings per 100,000 population in 1992 was only slightly below
the national median of 6,610 for the same year.41 Alaska's rate
138. Id. at 993.
139. Id. at 994. In a later case, the court added that full fee awards "encourage
meritorious claims which might otherwise not be brought." Hickel v. Southeastern
Conference, 868 P2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1994) (citations omitted).
140. Hunsicker v. Thompson, 717 P.2d 358, 359 (Alaska 1986). The court may'
reduce the award if, for example, it finds the hourly rate to be excessive or the
total hours unreasonable. Id.
141. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at 11, Fig. 1.13 (1994) [hereinafter NCSC
STATISTICS 1992].
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in 1993 was also only slightly below the national median.142
Tort filings represent a subset of civil filings that may be more
closely related to fee shifting. Torts include high profile matters
like legal and medical malpractice, products liability and wrongful
death cases, which are at the center of debates about fee shifting
and civil justice reform. Some observers caution that the prospect
of an adverse fee award could chill access to the courts, at least for
some plaintiffs in tort cases. 43
We also compared tort filing trends in Alaska to filings in
states that did not shift fees. In 1993, the National Center for State
Courts reported that the only substantial period of growth in tort
filings nationwide had occurred between 1985 and 1986 and that
tort filings actually had declined by about 2% since 1990.1' In
Alaska, tort filings increased modestly between 1985 and 1986,
decreased drastically between 1986 and 1989"45 and decreased
slightly or remained relatively constant until 1992.146 Figure 1
142. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS, 1993, at 12 (1995) [hereinafter NCSC STATISTICS 1993]. Alaska's
rate was 4,046, and the national median was 4,704. Id.
143. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139, 143.
144. NCSC STATISTICS 1992, supra note 141, at 17. This data come from
twenty-two states that have reported comparable data from the 1985 to 1992
period. Idt at 16.
145. As Figure 1 shows, tort filings in Alaska statewide decreased by 29%
between 1986 and 1987 and by 44% between 1987 and 1988. See infra Table
Appendix. These drastic drops probably were related to changes in population
caused by a severe economic downturn in Alaska from 1985 to 1988. During the
period of most severe retrenchment in 1986 and 1987, the rate of population
change dropped to -1.8%. "By 1989, however, net out-migration slowed enough
to allow the natural increase of births over deaths to produce the first increase in
population since 1985." ALASKA DEP'T OF LABOR, ALASKA POPULATION
OVERVIEW 1988 & PROvISIONAL 1989 ESTIMATES 17 (1990). Another possible
explanation for the decreases in tort filings after 1986 could be passage of "tort
reform" legislation in Alaska in 1986. See 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 139. Other civil
filings statewide showed a slightly different trend than tort filings. While they
increased steadily from 1982 to 1985 and fell between 1985 and 1986, the 1985-
1986 drop was only 17%. By 1987, civil filings were on the increase again. The
spike in 1989 could reflect judicial real estate foreclosure filings related to the bust.
Although exact figures were not available from the court system, one of the co-
authors of this Article, Susanne Di Pietro, was a superior court law clerk in 1987
and 1988 and confirmed that judicial foreclosures formed a large part of the case
load during those years.
146. NCSC STATISTICS 1992, supra note 141, at 17.
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depicts the trend graphically.'47 Thus, Alaska's statewide tort
filing trends resemble those in jurisdictions that do not shift
attorney's fees. The similarity suggests that fee shifting in Alaska
does not cause differences between Alaska's trends and those
elsewhere.
We further compared tort filings statewide and in Anchorage
to other civil filings from mid-1985 through mid-1995. Figure 2'4
shows that tort filings in Anchorage dropped sharply from fiscal
years 1986 through 1989 and remained flat compared to other types
of civil filings, which were more volatile during the late 1980s.
Figure 1 shows the same trend statewide. For the past few years,
tort filings statewide and in Anchorage have been moving upward
in numbers, but not as rapidly as other civil filings.
Tort trends can also be understood by examining filing rates
in specific years rather than looking at actual numbers or percent-
ages of filings. Figure 3149 compares Alaska's population-adjusted
tort filing rates to those in twenty-eight other states for which the
National Center for State Courts had data. Alaska's rates consis-
tently fell in the lowest group, fewer than 200 tort filings per
100,000 population.' The methods by which states count and
classify civil cases affect filing rates, as do economic, social and
cultural factors. Many of the states in the low group..' had
significant rural populations and one or two large cities, as does
Alaska. 2 Many of the states in the higher groups, on the other
147. See infra Table Appendix. Data on "other civil filings" came from the
court system's annual reports. Other civil filings included administrative review
(primarily workers' compensation cases), "debt/contract" and "other" or "general"
cases. Domestic relations, probate and children's matters do not appear on this
graph.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See NCSC STATISTICS 1992, supra note 141, at 18; NCSC STATISTICS 1993,
supra note 142, at 22. Between 1990 and 1994, Alaska's tort filing rates per
100,000 population hovered between 139 and 150. In 1990 and 1992, Alaska's
population-adjusted rates were greater than the rates in five of the twenty-nine
states reporting. NCSC STATISTICS 1992, supra note 141, at 18. In 1991, Alaska's
rate was greater than the rates in six of the twenty-nine states reporting. Id. In
1993, Alaska's rate was higher than the rates in seven of the twenty-nine states
reporting. NCSC STATISTICS 1993, supra note 142, at 22.
151. The low group included Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Utah and Wisconsin.
152. Approximately half of Alaska's residents live in the city of Anchorage.
1996 WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 427. In 1994, Alaska's total
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hand, had larger proportions of urban residents. Thus, Alaska did
not seem demographically inconsistent with the other states in the
lowest group. In short, although the available data cannot exclude
the possibility that Alaska's relatively low tort filing rate is related
to fee shifting, neither can one conclude from these data that Rule
82 perceptibly "chills" the filing of tort claims.
Although tort cases tend to take center stage in discussions of
fee shifting, they do not reflect the complete civil litigation picture.
Contract cases form a large part of the total civil caseload in most
jurisdictions, including Alaska. Aggregate national trends for
contract cases are difficult to pinpoint, since most states' contract
filings have shown substantial year-to-year variation.15 ' Research
suggests that contract filing rates are tied to changes in the
economy, with economic downturns leading to fewer contract filings
over the next several years."u In Alaska, the number of contract
cases filed in 1992 declined by 21% from the number filed in
1990,"5s a more rapid decline than that for tort filings in the same
two-year period.
2. Caseload Composition. General filing trends do not
reveal much about actual caseload composition. However, the
National Center for State Courts has compiled data that help
identify whether Alaska has relatively fewer tort cases compared to
other states. The national data indicate that contract, tort and real
property suits together are the second-largest component of total
civil caseloads, after domestic relations cases.'56
Figure 4.57 shows that contract, tort and real property cases
(general civil cases) made up approximately 32% of the total civil
court caseloads in general jurisdiction trial courts in the United
States in 1992.158 Contract cases accounted for 12% of the
national general civil total, while tort suits (including personal
injury, malpractice, wrongful death and property damage cases) and
population was 606,276, while Anchorage Borough's was 253,647. Id.
153. NCSC STATISTICS 1992, supra note 141, at 20.
154. NCSC STATISTICS 1993, supra note 142, at 26.
155. Id.
156. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Caseloads Rise in State Courts,
1 NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTs. J. 1, 15 (1994) [hereinafter NCSC, Caseloads Rise].
To improve the comparison, small claims cases have been omitted from the
national pie chart. Id
157. See infra Table Appendix.
158. NCSC, Caseloads Rise, supra note 156, at 15.
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real property cases each constituted about 10%.' Figure 5 0
shows Alaska's caseload composition in general jurisdiction trial
courts. The main difference between Alaska's total civil caseload
and the national caseload data is that domestic relations cases
(including civil domestic violence cases) made up a larger percent-
age of the total caseload in Alaska (60%) than in the national data
(38.5%).161
Taken together, Alaska courts had somewhat fewer "general
civil" cases in the total caseload than other states. In Alaska, tort,
contract, real property and other general civil cases made up about
23% of the total civil caseload.62 Within the category of general
civil cases, tort cases (personal injury and premises liability)
constituted only 5% of the total."6 The differences between
Alaska and national figures may well arise from differences in case
definition. Yet, they also may reflect significant differences in the
composition of Alaska's civil caseload, in which case, fee shifting
may account for some or all of the difference.?"
3. Trial Rates and Prevailing Parties. Trial rates may vary as
a result of fee shifting. Some have predicted that' attorney fee
159. Id.
160. See infra Table Appendix.
161. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT S-18 (1994) [hereinafter
ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 1993]; NCSC, Caseloads Rise, supra note 156, at 15.
Probate (estate) cases also comprised a larger proportion in Alaska (18%) than
nationally (10%). Id& However, because of methodological differences in data
collection, the Alaska data from ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 1993 may not be
identical to Alaska data from national sources.
162. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 1993, supra note 161, at S-18.
163. Id. at S-32. A third category of general civil cases, described as "Other"
by the court system, comprised 52% of the total. Id. This category may include
real property cases.
164. This evaluation did not consider all of the possible factors that could create
a caseload in which domestic relations and probate cases constitute a relatively
large percentage of the general trial court's work and civil and tort cases make up
a smaller than typical proportion of civil cases. For instance, the types of cases
that constitute the caseloads vary significantly from state to state. Alaska's
caseload does not include enforcement/collection proceedings or temporary
injunctions, which many states do include. Because neither these nor small claims
cases, which Alaska handles in the district court, are counted in Alaska's superior
court totals, the data may sufficiently skew the proportions of types of cases
handled in the various courts so that it appears that Alaska has a lower than
average rate of tort filings.
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shifting would encourage earlier settlement." Data collected by
the National Center for State Courts showed that trial rates for civil
caseloads (including domestic relations and small claims cases) in
general jurisdiction courts in twenty-seven states in 1993 averaged
7.6%, with bench trials accounting for 6.4% of the total.' 66
Alaska reported a total trial rate of 3.9% for that time period,
excluding domestic relations and "other" cases.167 Figure 6 shows
how Anchorage superior court disposition methods have varied
over time."6 Trials, both jury and non-jury, have constituted a
small percentage of case dispositions, remaining stable as a
percentage of the overall caseload. As in most other jurisdictions,
jury trial rates vary little from year to year. 69 Courts in most
jurisdictions try tort cases less frequently than other civil cases.
Data collected from the nation's seventy-five most populous
counties from 1991 to 1992 showed that courts resolved only 3% of
tort cases at trial. Although more medical malpractice, premis-
es liability and product liability torts went to trial,' only 2% of
165. This is one of the purposes frequently stated for Alaska's Rule 82. See
supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
166. NCSC STATISTICS 1993, supra note 142, at 14.
167. Id. Because Alaska's total trial rates did not include domestic relations
and small claims trials, they probably are skewed toward the low end of the trial
rate scale. For the disposition of domestic relations and "other" civil cases, see
ALASKA COURT SYSTEM 1993, supra note 161, at S-30, S-34. For example, in
Anchorage in 1993, the state's general jurisdiction trial court resolved about 7%
of its domestic relations cases by trial, and about 3% of its "other civil" cases by
trial (other civil cases exclude domestic relations, probate and children's cases).
Alaska's limited jurisdiction trial court, which hears small claims cases, resolved
about 8% by trial in the higher-volume locations. Id. at S-48.
168. See infra Table Appendix. Much of the variation in methods of disposition
other than trials may result from changing methods of categorizing cases or from
changes in training for clerks entering data.
169. NCSC STATISTICS 1993, supra note 142, at 14 ("Unlike bench trial rates
... there is little variation in jury trial rates.").
170. Roger Hanson et al., Tort Change is Thorny, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 30, 1995, at
A21, A23; see also Barbara Franklin, Learning Curve: Lawyers Must Confront
Impact of Changes on Litigation Strategies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 62, 65
(including data from National Center for State Courts from a project sponsored
by Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics). Another source provided
data indicating that 4% of tort cases went to jury trial. Taking the "Pulse" of Tort
Litigation, 1 STATE Cr. REPORTER 3 (1995).
171. Franklin, supra note 170, at 65. Medical malpractice cases were resolved
at trial 6.9% of the time, premises liability cases 3.8% of the time and product
liability cases 3.3% of the time. Id.
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auto accident cases (the largest category of tort case) went to
trial.7 2
In our sample of state court cases, 3% of the civil cases
concluded with a trial." More tort cases in the sample-about
4%-went to trial than did other types of civil cases.7 Nine
percent of wrongful death cases in the sample and 28% of malprac-
tice cases went to trial.' This finding shows the complexity of
the possible effects of Rule 82. Alaska may have fewer tort filings
than other states, but it has more tort trials. Even a few trials can
make substantial work for the court and increase costs to parties
and to the justice system. It may be that fee shifting discourages
some plaintiffs from filing tort cases but encourages at least a few
of those who do file tort claims to pursue their cases more
aggressively. Any savings made because fewer cases enter the
courts may be offset by increased resources devoted to trials.
Nationally, 16% of cases tried in 1993 were malpractice
cases,1 6 compared with 11% in Alaska. 7  Plaintiffs' attorneys
said that they did not take as many malpractice cases to trial
172. Id.
173. About 67% of the 85 trials in the Anchorage state court case sample were
non-jury trials. The sample was designed to be representative of cases to which
Rule 82 would apply.
174. The sample was drawn from all civil cases closed in Anchorage in 1993.
The database was weighted and included 40 tort jury and non-jury trials, of 737
cases. Included were all cases described as malpractice, property damage,
wrongful death and personal injury. Data provided by the supreme court to the
legislature as a fiscal note for 1995 tort reform legislation also cited a trial rate of
4% for tort cases in Alaska in Fiscal Year 1994. H.R. 158, 19th Leg. (1995).
175. Seven of the nine malpractice cases that went to trial were coded as non-
jury trials. This high rate of non-jury trials for malpractice cases may be a coding
error related to Alaska's statutory pre-screening procedure for medical malpractice
cases. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1994). The category also included legal
and accounting malpractice cases, some of which may have gone to trial.
176. NCSC STATISTICS 1993, supra note 142, at 24. Another source said that
6.9% of medical malpractice cases were resolved at trial. Franklin, supra note 170,
at 65. Other national data indicate that medical malpractice cases account for
11% of all jury trials and that jury trials are twice as prevalent among medical
malpractice cases'as among civil dispositions in general. John A. Goerdt et al.,
Litigation Dimensions: Torts and Contracts in Large Urban Courts, 19 STATE Cr.
J. 23, 24 (1995).
177. The variations in data about trial rates in malpractice cases may result from
including more cases (all malpractice rather than just medical malpractice) or from
using different databases. All sources appear to agree that malpractice cases went
to trial more often than other types of tort or civil cases.
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because about 75% of malpractice trial verdicts were for defen-
dants. None mentioned Rule 82 as a major factor in their
decision. In fact, we found that the defendants and plaintiffs each
prevailed 50% of the time in the handful of Alaska malpractice
trials.
State court data contained six personal injury jury trials in
which an identifiable party prevailed. Of those six trials, defen-
dants prevailed in four, or 67%. In property damage jury trials, the
split was even between plaintiffs and defendants. Only in civ-
il/contract jury trials did plaintiffs claim an edge, with four of the
six plaintiffs prevailing. Overall, the split was equal.
Plaintiffs fared better in non-jury trials for civil/contract cases,
with ten of sixteen plaintiffs winning at trial (63%). 111 Plaintiffs
fared better in non-jury personal injury trials, with all four of the
plaintiffs prevailing (100%). Defendants prevailed in two-thirds of
the injunctive relief suits, and in non-jury malpractice and property
damage trials, plaintiffs and defendants split evenly. These small
numbers cannot state with statistical accuracy the likelihood that
any particular case will result in a certain outcome, but they suggest
that civil trials in Alaska may not favor either plaintiffs or defen-
dants with any certainty."
The outcomes appear consistent with the results of the
attorney interviews. Attorneys gave the merits of the case the
primary place in their panoply of reasons for taking the risks of
trial. Client interest played a strong role, and attorneys did say
that a few clients who saw their case as particularly strong viewed
Rule 82 as an added incentive to go to trial. Most, however, saw
the chance of having to pay attorney's fees as an added reason to
avoid trial.
4. Federal District Court Data. Alaska's federal district
courts apply fee shifting to some federal cases under the District's
178. National data supported this perception. One source said that 30% of
malpractice verdicts were for plaintiffs. NCSC STATIsTIcs 1993, supra note 142,
at 25. Overall, plaintiffs won about 50% of the time in jury trials, id., consistent
with Alaska's experience.
179. These data take into account only the cases in which one or the other party
clearly prevailed. Nineteen of the 53 non-jury trials ended in a dismissal as the
final action.
180. Again, this finding is consistent with national data that suggest that
plaintiffs and defendants prevail in about equal numbers in civil trials. See supra
note 178 and accompanying text.
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Local Rules.'' We reviewed all federal cases closed in 1993 to
which Rule 82 might have applied, either because they were
diversity cases"8 or because the district court's local rules apply
Rule 82. Three hundred and fifty-nine cases met these criteria.
We reviewed the composition of this group of cases, as well as data
from the district courts' and Ninth Circuit's reports.
Figure 7" shows the composition of the federal cases. Tort
cases made up about 28% (96) of the group of civil cases closed in
1993 in the Anchorage federal district court that we reviewed.
Within this group, the seventy-five personal injury cases constituted
the largest group (78%), with small numbers of malpractice (2),
property damage (7) and wrongful death (12) cases. For compari-
son, the Anchorage civil court caseload had 19% tort cases, and the
national data showed an average of 32% tort cases in civil case-
loads for selected jurisdictions."
Among Anchorage federal district court cases examined, 5%
concluded with a trial.'" As did the Anchorage state courts, the
federal district court appeared to try a larger percentage of tort
cases than other civil cases. About 7% of federal personal injury
cases went to trial, as did about 8% of wrongful death cases8 6
and 5% of the "other contract" cases." This pattern of relatively
low tort filings and higher tort trial rates resembles that found for
state court cases in the 1993 Anchorage database and in the
statewide data.
Overall, comparing Alaska's filing trends and caseload
composition to those in other states was difficult because the data
often were not strictly comparable. The comparison suggested that
Alaska's tort filing trends resembled trends in jurisdictions that did
181. D. ALASKA LOCAL R. 54.3.
182. Rule 82 applies to diversity cases in federal court in which the court applies
state law. Rule 82 would apply to diversity cases under Local Rule 54.3, even if
it did not apply otherwise.
183. See infra Table Appendix.
184. The federal courts did not have any domestic relations cases in their
caseload, and the composition of the civil court caseload varied in other significant
ways. These data should not be used to draw firn conclusions about effects of fee
shifting or other policies.
185. Of the nineteen federal cases resolved at trial, most (79%) were resolved
without a jury. In both the state and federal cases, about 1% of all cases were
resolved by jury trial.
186. Neither of the two federal malpractice cases went to trial.
187. Three of the four federal jury trials in 1993 were civil and contract cases.
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not shift fees. However, the data supported a different conclusion
for caseload composition. Alaska state courts may have had a
lower rate of tort filings than other state courts, although we could
not say whether lack of data comparability, fee shifting or other
factors caused the differences in caseload.
The finding that other jurisdictions had lower rates of tort
trials than other civil trials while Anchorage had higher rates of
tort trials emphasized the need to consider all aspects of case
processing when looking for effects of fee shifting. Taken as a
whole, these data suggest that if fee shifting affects case filing
trends and trial rates in Alaska, the effects are complex and may
result in a net situation little different from that found in states that
do not shift fees.
B. Amount and Frequency of Attorney Fee Awards in Anchorage
Cases
Another question raised by a fee-shifting scheme is how it
operates in practice. How often are attorney's fee awards made,
and how much money typically is awarded? To answer these
questions, we sampled groups of recently closed state and federal
court cases in Anchorage to which Rule 82 would apply."' We
also interviewed 161 litigation attorneys licensed to practice in
Alaska and asked them to answer a series of questions about two
of their most recently resolved civil cases." 9
1. Frequency of Attorney's Fee Awards. How often do courts
award attorney's fees? Although Rule 82 applies in principle to
most state court civil cases and to all federal diversity cases, 90 we
did not expect to find many fee awards in the court case files.
Until a case progresses to judgment, one party has not prevailed,
and courts would not make a fee award. We know from experi-
ence that most cases settle before that point. The data confirmed
this hypothesis: Only about 10% of state cases contained a Rule
188. For an explanation of how we sampled the cases, see AJC, ALASKA'S
ENGLISH RULE, supra note *, at app. A. For a description of the types of cases
in the sample, see id. at app. D.
189. The attorneys' names were drawn at random from a list of 240 attorneys
whose names appeared in litigated cases filed with the state court system in
Anchorage. For the interview questions we asked attorneys, see id. at app. C.
190. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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82 attorney's fee award,' 9' and only 6% of the federal cases
included a Rule 82 attorney's fee award."9
While we anticipated finding few fee awards in cases settled
short of judgment, we were surprised that relatively few of the trial
cases contained a fee award. Fee awards were made in only about
half (52%) of the state court trials and only in 22% of the federal
cases resolved at trial.93 One possible explanation might have
been that bench trials and hearings were difficult to distinguish in
the case files. However, a review of the state court cases failed to
support the hypothesis that hearings had been mistakenly coded as
trials.
Because the court files contained little explanation for the
relatively low number of fee awards in trial cases, we asked the
judges and attorneys chosen for this study about situations in which
a Rule 82 award would not occur after trial.'94 Eight of the
twenty-nine trial judges interviewed stated that they did not make
fee awards where neither party prevailed. Six said they did not
make fee awards if both parties prevailed in some significant
respect, that is, if the case were "a wash." Eleven judges reported
that they did not make fee awards if the prevailing party "forgot to
file the motion" or "didn't bother to file a motion."'95
The attorney interviews supported the judges' observations.
Of the adjudicated'96 cases attorneys described, Rule 82 awards
occurred in slightly more than half (57%). The most common
reason attorneys gave for lack of a Rule 82 award in adjudicated
cases was post-judgment settlement (about one-third of the cases).
Attorneys reported that perhaps the most common form of
settlement involved the prevailing party's agreement not to apply
for fees in exchange for the loser's promise not to file a notice of
191. The 93 cases in our state court sample that contained a fee award served
as the basis of our description of attorney fee awards.
192. Twenty of the 359 federal cases contained a Rule 82 fee award.
193. The federal court made fee awards in all four of the jury trials. The
extremely low incidence of fee awards in federal non-jury trials could reflect the
ambiguity of a "trial" versus a "hearing."
194. While the judges and attorneys could not speak with authority about our
specific case file data, their general knowledge and experience with the civil
litigation system was relevant.
195. The current version of the state rule requires that the party asking for a
fee award file a motion "within 10 days after the date shown in the clerk's
certificate of distribution on the judgment." ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(c).
196. Adjudicated cases include those resolved by trial or dispositive motion.
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appeal or to dismiss the appeal. Attorneys reported that about
12% of the adjudicated cases lacking a Rule 82 award had settled
for this trade. The next most common reason attorneys gave for
lack of a Rule 82 attorney's fee award in an adjudicated case was
that a state or federal statute precluded operation of Rule 82.
Other reasons, in order of frequency, were that neither party
prevailed, that a contract provision governed the attorney's fee
award, that the prevailing party failed to request a fee award for a
reason other than post-judgment settlement and that the losing
party declared bankruptcy.
Similarly, we were surprised at how few of the default
judgments contained a fee award. Fee awards appeared in only
38% of the state cases that ended with a default judgment, and in
only one of the twenty-four federal default judgment cases.
Further analysis of the state court default judgments without Rule
82 awards showed that almost all of these were based on causes of
action arising out of negligence, while those that did contain fee
awards involved other matters. This finding is not surprising, as
1986 tort reform legislation prohibited fee awards to the prevailing
party in uncontested negligence suits.19'
Cases ending in a judgment other than a default were more
likely to contain Rule 82 awards than cases ending in dismissal or
settlement; however, not all the judgments contained fee awards.
About 59% of the state cases with a judgment other than a default
had a Rule 82 award. Only about one quarter of the federal cases
that concluded with a non-default judgment contained a Rule 82
award. Again, the case files contained little information to explain
the absence of an award.'98 In less than 1% of the state cases
and in one federal case, the file contained a ruling by the judge that
the parties must bear their own fees.
Judges suggested other reasons why cases with a judgment
might not contain a fee award. Almost all of the judges said they
would not make a fee award if the prevailing party did not request
one. They speculated that these cases might have settled post-
judgment, with the prevailing party agreeing to forego a fee award
in exchange for some concession from the loser as to an appeal, a
197. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 139 § 4 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010); see
supra note 38.
198. One hypothesis as to why so few judgments contained fee awards is that
some were stipulated lump-sum judgments that did not separately list attorney's
fees.
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payment plan or other terms. As discussed above, interviews with
attorneys for this study suggested that Rule 82 awards do play a
significant role in post-judgment settlements, although it seems
unlikely that post-judgment settlements accounted for all the
judgments in which no fee award was made.
Five of the judges said they declined to make fee awards if the
"equities" of a case weighed against it. The most common
equitable scenario they identified as mitigating against a fee was
where "one party prevails on the law, but the equities favor the
loser." One judge gave an example in which the plaintiff sued the
parents of neighborhood children who had burglarized his house.
The judge dismissed the case because he found that the parents
were not legally liable for the damage caused by their children's
actions, but he denied the parents' fee request. Two other judges
reported denying fee awards "where the attorney in a small claims
case has not improved the process" and where "neither side has
clean hands."
One judge reported declining to make fee awards in small
claims cases (to discourage over-litigation) and denying fee awards
where the prevailing party was not paying for his attorney (for
example, where the party was represented under a prepaid legal
plan or by the state Attorney General's office). Another did not
make awards when a fee award would result in a "windfall" for the
prevailing party (for example, where fees for a contested summary
judgment motion would exceed the actual attorney's fees incurred).
In a few instances, cases that settled contained a Rule 82
award (39 of the 439 state cases coded as "settled" and two of the
eleven federal cases coded as "settled"). An explanation was
described by two judges (one state and one federal) for cases in
which the parties reach settlement on everything except fees.
These judges instruct the parties to submit the fees to be decided
on motion. Another explanation was suggested by our interviews
with attorneys. Some attorneys described cases in which the judge
had granted a partial or fall summary judgment motion that
resolved the major part of the case and then awarded attorney's
fees on the motion. The attorneys were left to settle the remaining
issues.'99
Most discussions about attorney's fees occur in the context of
tort cases. However, tort cases do not comprise the majority of
199. The settlement usually involved waivers of attorney's fees.
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cases in which fees are shifted. For example, the federal court
made three quarters of its Rule 82 awards in federal civil and
contract cases.' Only one award was made in a federal personal
injury case,"'1 and one award occurred in each group of cases
involving malpractice, injunctive relief, real estate and property
damage. No awards occurred in a wrongful death case. In the
state court sample, personal injury cases accounted for about 28%
of total cases and 16% of the Rule 82 awards.
2. Amounts of Attorney's Fee Awards. A second issue is the
size of attorney's fee awards. How often does the prevailing party
win a large fee award? In state court, about 39% of the Rule 82
awards were under $1,000. One third fell between $1,000 and
$5,000, and about 27% exceeded $5,000.1 The median Rule 82
award was $2,240.' The federal Rule 82 awards were larger. A
majority (60%) of the federal Rule 82 awards exceeded $5 ,000.'20
Thirty percent fell between $1,000 and $5,000, and only two were
less than $1,000. The median Rule 82 award for federal cases was
$10,854. "5
Eighty-seven cases described by attorneys involved a fee award
for which they knew the amount. Of these, 15% were less than
$1,000. About 27% fell between $1,000 and $5,000, and 58%
exceeded $5,000. Eight of the awards described by attorneys
exceeded $50,000. The median Rule 82 award described by
attorneys was $9,000.' Fee awards in cases described to us by
attorneys probably were larger than those in the case files because
we asked attorneys specifically to tell us about recent trials or
contested cases, thus biasing the attorney case sample toward the
higher end of the case value range. Also, attorneys may have
included court costs with attorney's fees.
The data from attorney interviews suggested that fee awards
200. Civil and contract cases accounted for about 60% of our federal cases.
201. These cases comprised about 21% of the total federal cases.
202. Our state court sample contained only two awards greater than $50,000.
203. The largest state court award was $120,846; the smallest was $120.
204. The federal cases contained seven awards greater than $100,000. One
reason for the difference may be that cases in federal court may involve larger
damages and judgments than the average state court case. Another may be that
attorneys spend more time on federal cases than on state court cases. See Kritzer
et al., supra note 84, at 8.
205. The largest award was $654,913; the smallest was $375.
206. The largest award was $650,000; the smallest was $74.
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in cases that went to trial or were otherwise strongly contested
often climbed into the tens of thousands of dollars. However, the
more representative data from the state and federal court files
confirmed that cases with small awards outnumbered those
containing large fee awards. In the cases reported to us by
attorneys, differences between the values of plaintiffs' awards and
defendants' awards emerged with cross-tabulations. Calculations
showed that 31% of defendants, versus only 14% of plaintiffs,
received awards of $5,000 to $150,000. In other words, defendants
told us about cases that resulted in larger awards more often than
did plaintiffs' attorneys.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined attorney's fee shifting in Alaska,
both by collecting extensive data from case files and by conducting
thorough interviews with numerous attorneys and judges with
knowledge of the operation of Civil Rule 82. From these data we
have described the rule's operation in some detail. However, it is
important to remember that we could not compare these data to a
control group of cases in which Rule 82 did not apply because the
rule applies to most state civil cases, to federal diversity cases and
to some other federal cases through local court rules.2"8 Thus, we
could not directly compare how cases would be litigated with and
without the application of Rule 82. Nevertheless, our findings
should help Alaskans understand the effects of Rule 82 and assist
policymakers nationwide to evaluate proposed fee-shifting rules or
statutes in their jurisdictions.
A. Rule 82 Seldom Played a Significant Role in Civil Litigation
The major conclusion of this Article is that attorney's fee
shifting in Alaska seldom played a significant role in civil litigation.
An almost infinite number of factors structured the litigation of
civil claims. These included, but certainly were not limited to, the
type of dispute involved, the parties' personalities, the parties'
financial resources, the strength of the legal claims involved and the
207. Although fee awards in the hundreds of thousands of dollars were not the
norm, attorneys' and litigants' knowledge that they could occur might have
nevertheless affected their behavior.
208. The rule does not apply to divorce and a few other types of cases, which
either could not be compared because they differed in nature or were too few in
number to make a valid analysis.
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magnitude of the stakes. The possibility of having to pay the other
side's attorney's fees was only a minor factor on this list.'
One measure of Rule 82's influence was the frequency with
which fee awards occurred. Rule 82 awards were made in only a
small percentage of cases examined: only 10% of the state court
case sample and 6% of federal court cases contained a fee award.
Even among cases resolved at trial or on dispositive motion, a small
fraction of the total civil caseload, few fee awards were made.
Such awards were rare for several reasons: (1) the case may have
settled before the fee award; (2) neither party may have "pre-
vailed;" (3) both parties may have prevailed in some respect; or (4)
a contract provision or statute may have governed fee awards.
Even when fee awards were made, parties actually paid the
award less than half of the time. The prevailing party collected the
award in only 40% of the fifty-seven cases attorneys identified as
having a fee award.10 Parties were unable to collect awards
because the person against whom the award was made was
judgment-proof or had declared bankruptcy, or because the
prevailing party waived fees as part of a post-judgment settlement.
Surprisingly, the rule did not often affect filing decisions either.
In another example of the subtlety of Rule 82's effects, only 35%
of the 161 experienced litigators we interviewed could remember
any case in which the rule played a significant role in their clients'
decisions to file a claim or assert a counterclaim. The overall cost
of litigation and the attorney's assessment of the strength of the
case played the largest roles in the filing decision.
The rule did not often affect litigation or settlement strategies.
Rule 82 influenced litigation strategy in only 34% of the 305
recently resolved civil litigation cases described by these attorneys.
It affected settlement strategy in 37% of those cases. Attorneys
said that they litigated and made decisions about settlements on the
merits of the case, regardless of Rule 82. In some instances, Rule
82 played no role because the potential fee award was too small or
was uncollectible.
While Rule 82 applies to most civil litigation in Alaska, our
data suggested that it influenced only a minority of cases. Among
209. On the other hand, the possibility of being reimbursed for some attorney's
fees at the end of the case also was a minor factor in most cases.
210. An additional 42 cases in the attorney interview database contained fee
awards; however, attorneys did not know in those cases whether the award had
been collected.
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the cases it did influence, its effects were subtle. It was part of the
legal landscape-virtually all of the attorneys said that they made
sure their clients knew about Rule 82 before filing a litigation
case-but it seldom played more than a minor role in civil litigation
strategies.
B. The Effects of Rule 82 Varied
Keeping in mind that Rule 82 played only a minor role in most
civil litigation in Anchorage, we examined those cases in which fee
shifting did have an effect. Understanding Rule 82's effects in
these cases required careful attention to the context in which the
rule operates: the stage of the litigation, the type of case, the
parties' financial resources, the strengths of the parties' claims and
defenses and the parties' relative approach to risk.
The two factors that interacted most decisively with Rule 82 to
influence litigation strategy were the parties' financial resources and
the strength of their cases. Generally, the rule affected parties of
moderate means more than it did parties with more resources, and
much more than parties with few financial resources. As one
attorney noted, "the people who don't go to court are those who
just can't afford to lose [a Rule 82 award]." The rule tended to
discourage potential litigants with moderate financial assets
(middle-class people) in all types of cases from initial filing, unless
they had a strong case. The strength of a case is inversely propor-
tional to the likelihood of an adverse fee award. For those who
had assets to lose to an adverse attorney fee award, Rule 82
assumed greater importance, along with the strength of the case, in
the decision whether to file.
The rule also discouraged filing and encouraged settlement for
parties who perceived weaknesses in their cases. One attorney said
that Rule 82 affected clients' decisions "regularly when liability is
looking weak and the client is of modest means (ie, $10,000 in the
bank)." Conversely, it occasionally encouraged a litigant to pursue
more aggressively a case that he or she believed to be especially
strong. A defense attorney in a real estate case who thought the
plaintiff had a strong case said that "Rule 82 was the reason the
plaintiff filed before looking into settlement possibilities."
We tried to measure the frequency with which Rule 82 played
a role in discouraging potential litigants from using the courts.
About half (52%) of the plaintiff's attorneys interviewed could
recall an instance in which Rule 82 played a significant role in their
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client's decision to assert a claim.' Cases described by these
attorneys included tort, contract and real property cases. A few
attorneys (mostly plaintiffs' attorneys) thought the rule discouraged
some plaintiffs of moderate means with "decent" or "average"
cases from seeking redress in the courts, while most believed that
the effect occurred only with plaintiffs who had below-average or
weak cases.
Analysis of Alaska's civil litigation trends did not foreclose the
possibility that Rule 82 discouraged potential tort claimants from
filing suit, although the picture was by no means clear. The rate at
which tort cases were filed in Alaska's courts may be lower
compared to other states, and torts seemed to constitute a smaller
proportion of the total civil caseload in Alaska than in other
states. Many factors other than Rule 82 could account for
these data, such as cultural, social and economic factors, local legal
culture or lack of comparability of data. Moreover, Alaska's
overall civil filing rates were very close to the median for jurisdic-
tions that did not shift fees. Attorneys did not believe that Rule 82
obstructed indigent plaintiffs' access to the courts. Further, more
than half (55%) of the attorneys denied that the rule discouraged
potential plaintiffs with frivolous or extremely weak cases from
filing, although some thought that it did.2" Thus, if the rule
played a role in discouraging potential tort plaintiffs from using the
courts, it had a selective impact that depended heavily on case
strength and parties' assets.
Contract and debt cases presented a slightly different picture.
In some small collection actions, debt cases and meritorious but
uncomplicated small claims cases, attorneys and judges believed
that the rule actually encouraged filing. For at least some of these
cases, the probability of a fee award at the end made filing
economically feasible where otherwise it may not have been.
However, Rule 82 contributed to increased filings in other
ways. Among the cases that would not be found in a jurisdiction
211. Note that a few of these attorneys could have been referring to cases in
which the rule encouraged rather than discouraged filing.
212. On the other hand, some evidence suggested that tort cases went to trial
more often in Alaska than elsewhere. It may be that fee shifting discouraged at
least some plaintiffs from filing but encouraged those who do file to pursue their
cases more aggressively.
213. Thirty-six percent said it did discourage frivolous claims, and 9% did not
answer or had no opinion.
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that did not shift fees were insurance policy limits/bad faith cases
and appeals of fee awards. Parties may file too few of these cases
to affect statewide trends,214 but they did consume a substantial
amount of time for some attorneys (insurance defense) and a small
to moderate amount of time for attorneys with appellate practices.
The Alaska Supreme Court Justices did not seem to think fee
award issues consumed undue judicial resources, although jurisdic-
tions adopting fee shifting for the first time could probably expect
appellate judges to spend a moderate amount of time at the front
end establishing case law on fee shifting issues.
Of particular note, the rule did not seem to affect the filing of
frivolous claims. Sixty-four percent of attorneys interviewed said
that Rule 82 did not deter frivolous litigation.215 Comments from
attorneys and judges suggested that "frivolous" litigation was driven
by factors generally outside the influence of Rule 82, particularly
non-economic factors. These factors included litigating for a
principle or because of emotion. A few attorneys described cases
in which they thought their opponents had evaluated the cases
incorrectly at the beginning, giving their clients unrealistic expecta-
tions, and then felt obliged to follow through with litigation. Two
attorneys told about cases in which their clients "unreasonably"
insisted on trying the case against their advice and lost badly.
The rule had moderate and often contradictory effects on
settlement strategy. It increased the value of reasonable cases,
pushed strong cases toward trial and caused some plaintiffs to
discount their claims. In tort cases where a claimant had a strong
case and the damages were substantial, Rule 82 encouraged the
defense to settle a case earlier than it otherwise might, due to the
likelihood of a large adverse fee award after trial. A defense
attorney confirmed that where the plaintiff has a "valid" cause of
action, the defendant's "Rule 82 exposure is more clear," and the
defense will probably "pursue settlement earlier."
For optimistic plaintiffs, the likelihood of increasing total
recovery with a fee award after trial discouraged early settlement,
214. The increased litigation in these areas may be offset by the chilling effect
discussed previously. See supra text accompanying notes 65 and 143.
215. One obvious problem with this finding was the difficulty of distinguishing
a "frivolous" suit from one that was merely below average or weak in some aspect.
Another problem was a lack of information about the volume of frivolous cases.
An important future study would be a systematic empirical evaluation of frivolous
cases.
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at least where the case was being handled under a contingent fee
contract. It encouraged settlement in some cases by increasing the
stakes, while it discouraged settlement in a few by driving the
parties' offers farther apart. The rule caused some litigants, most
noticeably plaintiffs with assets who feared adverse awards, to
discount their claims. One plaintiff's personal injury attorney
stated that fear of Rule 82 exposure caused a client with some
assets and a good claim to settle for "less than the case was worth"
three or four times within the previous year. The rule influenced
some litigants with especially strong cases to inflate their claims;
one insurance defense attorney said, "It's just an extra 10% added
to the amount my client will pay in the end."
Given the rule's ability to encourage settlement in many types
of cases, does it put undue pressure on some litigants to settle?
216
The answer depends on the context. Plaintiff's attorneys thought
that the rule sometimes unduly pressured clients of moderate
means to settle for less than they otherwise felt they deserved.
This seemed true in all types of cases, including contingent fee
personal injury cases and contract cases. Some defense attorneys
also claimed that the rule put undue pressure on their insurance
company clients to settle in policy-limits cases and cases against
judgment-proof plaintiffs. There was evidence suggesting that some
cases in Alaska were filed and settled for "nuisance value,"
although these data did not permit us to say whether it happened
less in other jurisdictions.
Judges were asked what changes they would expect to see in
their courts if the supreme court revoked the rule. A slight
majority said that "a few more cases would go to trial that
currently settle" or that "litigation might increase by a small
percentage." One judge expected to see fewer parties filing non-
tort lawsuits, especially those in which they could recover little
money.27 A large minority of the judges predicted that if the
court revoked the rule, the only change in their courts would be
216. In the 1992 survey of Bar members regarding Rule 82, 68% of the
respondents did not believe that Rule 82 put "excessive pressure on moderate
income people to settle valid claims." Twenty-four percent thought that the rule
did exert excessive pressure.
217. One criticism of the American rule is that "the little man" in small value
lawsuits cannot afford to file justified suits because he will not recover enough
damages to cover attorney's fees and that attorneys do not take these cases on
contingency fees. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 795-96.
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"less work ruling on fee motions." These judges either did not
believe that Rule 82 promoted case settlement or they made few
fee awards because of the nature of their caseloads. The federal
judges in particular reported making very few Rule 82 fee awards.
C. A Majority of Alaska Practitioners Like the Rule
Seventy-three percent of the attorneys in our interview sample,
a representative cross-section of Alaska attorneys who used the
rule, recommended that it be retained.21 Thirty-six percent of
the attorneys wanted to keep the rule but modify it in some way.
Some suggested specific amounts: one attorney wanted to increase
all percentages by 10%; another wanted to increase them to 25%;
a third suggested increasing the percentage on judgments greater
than $100,000; a fourth wanted to front-load the first $25,000 more
heavily and decrease the percentages as the judgment amounts
increased; and two others suggested increasing the percentages on
the "lower-end" cases (from $25,000 to $100,000).219 Similarly,
80% of the 508 attorneys responding to the 1992 supreme court
survey voted to retain the rule.
Only a notable minority (35%) of attorneys in the current
218. Many of the attorneys who wanted to keep the rule suggested changing it.
Most of their suggestions were not fundamental changes. About a dozen attorneys
wanted to increase the percentage recoveries for monetary and/or nonmonetary
judgments. Other suggestions included: (1) capping the nonmonetary judgment
recovery amount; (2) going back to the pre-1993 rule; (3) making an exception in
employment cases; (4) increasing to full fee recovery; (5) changing fees in default
judgments to a percentage of actual fees; (6) removing the distinction between
"contested" and "contested with trial;" (7) linking the amount of the fee award to
the parties' relative reasonableness in settlement negotiations [Case law currently
forbids this approach. See Van Dort v. Culliton, 797 P.2d 642, 645 (Alaska 1990);
Myers v. Snow White Cleaners, 770 P.2d 750, 752 (Alaska 1989)]; (8) eliminating
attorney's fee awards for the defense in plaintiff personal injury cases absent a
finding that the case was frivolous; (9) requiring the plaintiff or the plaintiff's
attorney to post an "attorney's fee bond" in personal injury cases; (10) exempting
smaller-value cases from the rule; (11) giving trial judges more discretion in
making fee awards; (12) giving trial judges less discretion in making fee awards;
and (13) considering the relative wealth of the parties. The fact that so many
wanted change suggests that attorneys have different goals for the rule depending
on their practices. They suggested the changes that would most benefit their
clients or themselves.
219. This suggestion refers to Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield, 883 P.2d 2 (Alaska
1992), in which the supreme court upheld a large fee award against a plaintiff who
sued his employer.
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study who spent half or more of their time defending negligence
cases wanted to eliminate the rule. These attorneys believed that
the disadvantages to their clients of increased payouts outweighed
the advantages of recouping trial costs, using Rule 82 as a hammer
(along with Rule 68 offers) to force settlement or to discourage
marginal or frivolous claims.
On the other hand, 96% of the attorneys who spent half or
more of their time handling business and corporate matters wanted
to keep the rule. These attorneys, who often represented creditors
and other "repeat players," believed that the advantages for case
settlement and increased recoveries outweighed any disadvantages.
Like the Bar as a whole, plaintiff's attorneys who favored keeping
the rule (70%) thought that the advantages of higher recoveries
outweighed any chilling effects or undue pressure to settle. It
seemed that attorneys who had an adequate portfolio of cases to
choose from-who could choose strong cases-believed the rule
worked to their advantage more often than not.
To sum up, the three most apparent effects of Rule 82 were
that it (1) discouraged some middle class parties from filing cases
that either wealthy or poor plaintiffs would file, (2) discouraged
some suits (or defenses) of questionable merit and (3) encouraged
litigation in strong cases that might otherwise settle. The first
effect appears negative, although its impact is minimized because
it seldom occurs and because judges have the discretion to mitigate
it under the current rule. The second effect seems positive, and the
third may be positive or negative, depending on the observer's
perspective. Increased litigation burdens the courts. On the other
hand, certain legitimate suits may only be possible with the award
of attorney's fees. Examples include the pursuit of relatively small
debt cases, some types of public interest suits and meritorious but
uncomplicated small claims cases. Finally, a majority of attorneys
and judges in Alaska believed that the rule worked in a positive
way more often than not. The majority favored keeping the rule,
although a significant minority of insurance defense practitioners
favored its repeal.
D. Recommendations
Our recommendations have two parts: (1) recommendations to
Alaska and (2) recommendations to jurisdictions that do not shift
fees. The Alaska recommendations focus on how the rule works
and how to improve it. The national recommendations focus on
factors other jurisdictions might consider when thinking about two-
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way fee shifting.
1. Recommendations to Alaska Policymakers. We recom-
mend that Alaska retain Civil Rule 82, with limited changes.
Perhaps the best reason to do so is that, more often than not,
Alaska practitioners like the rule and think that it benefits them
and their clients more than it harms them or has no effect. Judges
also like the rule more often than not and are comfortable with its
operation. For the most part, Rule 82 seemed to affect the
processing and resolution of cases positively, even though this effect
was subtle and varied. The negative effects of the rule, when
tempered by the judicial discretion available under the 1993
amendments, were relatively minor and were offset by the rule's
benefits.
The Alaska Supreme Court should consider at least a few
possible changes to Rule 82 or the case law surrounding its
application. A number of attorneys questioned why plaintiff and
defendant recovery schedules differed. While the origins of the
dual recovery system remained unclear, we did learn that defen-
dants' percentages were set at a level intended to give the defen-
dant an amount proportionate to what the plaintiff's attorney
would recover in a one-third contingent fee tort case. The
assumption behind this structure presents a problem because it is
based on contingent fee cases despite the fact that most fee awards
in state court occur in contract or other non-personal injury cases.
If the Alaska Supreme Court intended to set defendant and
plaintiff recoveries the same, it would be more effective to hold
them both to a percentage of actual fees incurred. Another
possibility is to base fee awards on the amount of recovery, or, in
the event of no recovery, on the amount in controversy.' This
approach would ensure that both plaintiffs and defendants recov-
ered fees based on the same schedule, and it would increase the
predictability of the defendant's fee award. One drawback is that
plaintiff's attorneys would have to estimate time spent and
document it with affidavits or time sheets, and in cases such as
contingent fee and high-volume collections cases, they often do not
keep time sheets. Moreover, parties probably would disagree about
the amount in controversy in the event of a defense verdict,
220. This system is used successfully elsewhere. In Germany, the parties name
the damages up front, and the amount of the fee award is set as a percentage of
that amount. Pfennigstorf, supra note 2, at 63.
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requiring parties and judges to spend more time than is currently
spent settling the amount of fees. Finally, because the amount of
an attorney's fee award to a successful plaintiff might be less
predictable, Rule 82's influence in settling cases might decrease.
Another possibility is to develop different methods of recovery
for different types of cases. One schedule, based on a percentage
of actual fees, could apply to some cases (such as tort cases), while
another schedule, based on the amount in controversy, could apply
to others (such as debt/contract and real estate cases). The
advantage of this approach is that the rule could be better tailored
to meet its goals, although the process initially might be more
complicated and time-consuming.
Our interviews with attorneys and judges did not suggest that
the 1993 amendments had increased litigation at the trial court
level."M Our data do not support a recommendation that the
factors in the amendments be revoked. While the factors seldom
were invoked, they seemed to fit when invoked.' We also see
no real reason why attorney's fees in appellate cases should be
awarded based on a standard and arguably arbitrary amount.
Attorney's fees for appellate cases could equally well be set at 30%
of the reasonable fees spent on the appeal.
Finally, the distinction made in Alaska Supreme Court caselaw
between pro se litigants who are attorneys and those who are not
seems unjustified. The supreme court has held that non-attorney
pro se litigants can not recover attorney's fees, while attorney pro
se litigants can.' The court supported this distinction by reason-
ing that non-attorneys were more likely than attorneys to spend
time unnecessarily on legal issues and also that the court would not
know at what rate to compensate the pro se litigant. 4 Neither
of these rationales strongly supports the result. Litigants who
spend excessive time do not pose a problem if a money judgment
is recovered because the attorney's fee award is based on the
amount awarded, not on the time spent. If the prevailing party did
221. Litigation at the appellate level may increase if cases involving the eleven
statutory factors make their way up to the supreme court, although we did not
hear of many challenges to the factors.
222. Furthermore, Oregon recently incorporated them into its fee shifting
statute. See supra note 23.
223. Gates v. Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 463 (Alaska 1991); Alaska Fed.
Say. & Loan v. Bernhardt, 794 P.2d 579, 581-82 (Alaska 1990).
224. Alaska Fed. Say. & Loan, 794 P.2d at 581.
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not recover a money judgment, our interviews with judges suggest-
ed that the defeated adversary usually alerted the trial judge to
excessive legal work or hourly fees. Even without the defeated
party's help, judges were comfortable reviewing billings for
reasonableness. The court should reconsider whether the inequity
and economic detriment suffered by pro se litigants warrants
making them eligible for attorney's fee awards.'
2. Recommendations to National Policymakers. Our primary
recommendation to national policymakers is to think carefully
through the often conflicting effects of shifting attorney's fees
before adopting wholesale reforms. The subtle and complex
interactions of fee shifting with other aspects of the civil justice
system urge caution. Just as Alaskans should exercise care in
considering changes to the present system, other policymakers
should approach overall change in fee shifting practices with great
prudence.
The primary reason for this recommendation is that attorneys
and judges in state courts are neither familiar nor comfortable with
an attorney's fee shifting rule. Adopting a totally new system
inevitably brings substantial disruption and added work to the
justice system. Given the two-sided and often minor nature of
Rule 82's effects, any substantial disruption is unjustified.
Any reforms that involve attorney's fees on either the federal
or state level should carefully analyze the effects of fee shifting on
different types of cases (tort versus contract versus debt collection),
on parties with different financial resources and on the other
factors discussed in this Article. These effects of attorney's fee
shifting vary greatly depending on the situation. Those who
support fee shifting in hopes of decreasing claims, speeding up the
disposition of cases or inducing settlement should be advised of the
effects of Rule 82. In Alaska's experience, the rule's impact in
these areas has been complex, subtle and often contradictory.
Because the data suggested that the rule affected different
types of cases in identifiably different ways, policymakers should
clarify the rationales, desired effects and goals underlying fee
shifting. For example, if the primary rationale for fee shifting is
fairness to both sides, recovery for both defendants and plaintiffs
225. Litigants represented free of charge by Legal Services or another provider
are entitled to attorney's fees, even though they are not paying for the legal
services. See Gregory v. Sauser, 574 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1978).
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might be a percentage of actual fees. Judges said that they were
very comfortable reviewing billings for excessive time or hourly
rates and that these reviews were somewhat tedious but rarely too
time-consuming.
Policymakers whose rationales include discouraging frivolous
or meritless litigation probably should not adopt a scheme similar
to Alaska's.' Our data did not show that Alaska's system
significantly deterred frivolous litigation. The cost to another
jurisdiction of implementing the new system probably would
outweigh any benefits.2' However, policymakers who believe
that a punitive or deterrent rationale justifies fee shifting could
consider a rule permitting fee awards in cases where the judge
found the claim or defense to be frivolous. Our interviews suggest
that by the time the trial judge has seen the case through to
disposition, the judge has a fairly strong opinion as to the merits of
the litigation. However, to limit the judge's discretion, the law
should set guidelines for determining the amount of the award.
Our preference would be to tie the fee award to a percentage of
the amount the loser's unreasonable conduct caused the winner to
expend in fees.' In order to build some flexibility into the
system, we recommend including some factors similar to the ones
in Rule 82(b)(3). These factors are broad enough to give judges
and litigants leeway in appropriate cases, yet specific enough to
create needed uniformity in decisions.
Policymakers considering adopting fee shifting should keep in
mind two potential problems highlighted by attorneys interviewed
226. To the extent that policymakers wish to discourage litigation, we also
recommend against shifting full fees. First, the prospect of full fees could create
the problem of "the tail wagging the dog," where the fee amount at stake exceeds
the amount in controversy and begins to control the litigation. Also, the specter
of full fees probably would magnify the "chilling" effect on plaintiffs of moderate
means with average or weaker cases. Full fees also would magnify the effect of
encouraging protracted litigation and case filings for parties with strong claims.
227. One author noted that any rule aimed at deterring frivolous litigation
should focus on attorneys, rather than on their clients, because the attorneys are
better able to judge whether a claim has merit than are lay persons. Kordziel,
supra note 47, at 445. This author suggested, as did a handful of attorneys that we
interviewed, that Alaska Civil Rule 11 (or its federal counterpart) is the proper
means for deterring frivolous litigation. Id. Two attorneys that we interviewed
wished that state judges would weed out weak and marginal claims by granting
summary judgment more often.
228. Setting the award as a percentage of the amount in controversy or at some
arbitrary amount could result in fee awards out of proportion to the amount spent.
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for this Article. The first issue is the potentially large adverse fee
award that chills access to the courts or puts undue pressure to
settle on litigants of moderate means. 9 This phenomenon was
not widespread in our data but occurred relatively often in cases
with unclear liability or "soft" damages, with risk-averse plaintiffs
or with insurance companies facing Rule 82 exposure exceeding the
face value of the policy. Proposals that shift total rather than only
partial attorney's fees would exaggerate this effect.
The second issue is the two-way fee shift that becomes a one-
way shift in practice, as has happened in most jurisdictions.10 A
recurring criticism of Rule 82 was that it was "unfair" or "biased"
because of the one-way shift phenomenon. A lawyer within the
insurance industry who had experience with two-way fee shifting in
Alaska reported that the fee shifting rule rarely benefitted the
successful insurer, that insurers rarely collected awards from
unsuccessful plaintiffs and that the insurance industry did not
believe that fewer people filed "nuisance lawsuits" in Alaska than
in jurisdictions without fee shifting.
In conclusion, Rule 82 has not dramatically changed the legal
system in Alaska. Its effects are both complex and subtle and can
only be understood in the context of the particular situations in
which they arise.
229. One commentator has suggested that the contingent fee lawyer, not his or
her plaintiff client, be put at risk for costs. Herbert M. Kritzer, Searching for
Winners in a Loser Pays System, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54, 57. He predicts that
"[t]his type of cost-shifting arrangement probably would discourage speculative
litigation... [and] encourage plaintiff lawyers to take on the kinds of smaller
cases that are not as attractive under the contingent fee system." Id Another
approach is suggested by the Legal Society of England, which has created a special
kind of insurance, called Accident Line Protect, to protect the client from having
to pay his or her own solicitor's fees and the opponent's fees in the event of a loss.
Europeans have also developed legal insurance that pays the claimant's own
attorney without diminishing the claimant's damage award and pays the costs due
the opponent in the event of defeat. Pfennigstorf, supra note 2, at 60.
230. However, one commentator has argued that it is fair to deny fees to
prevailing defendants in non-frivolous lawsuits because a defendant who prevails
against a plaintiffs good-faith claim has suffered no legal "wrong" that would
entitle him or her to compensation. Rowe, supra note 2, at 658-59.
1996]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Table Appendix
Figure 1
Tort Filings Compared to Other CivlFilgs, Alaska
Adapted fromNational Center for State Courts &Ak. Q.System Reports
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Figure 4
National Civil Caseload Composition
Adapted fromNational Center forState Courts, 1992
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Figure 3
NationalTort Filings per 100,000 Population
Adapted fromNational Center for State Courts
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Figure 5
Superior Court Civil Cases, Alaska 1992-93
Adapted fromAlaska Court System Annual Report (1993)
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Figure 6
Other Civil Case Dispositions, 1989-95
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Figure 7
Federal Court Case Composition
Anchorage Civil Cases, Closed 1992
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